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This research work is driven by a desire to improve status quo in the area of New 
Zealand’s political, business and person-to-person relations with the post-Soviet 
Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (the Baltics or the Baltic States), 
which by now represent an integral part of the European Union (EU). The example 
of Estonia will be tested as a possible ‘gateway’ for New Zealand trying to 
undertake its most recent endeavours towards discovering the Baltic region. 
The dissertation’s response variable can be outlined as ‘New Zealand multi-
dimensional interactions with the post-Soviet Baltic Republics, particularly with the 
Republic of Estonia’. At the same time, the descriptive nature of the dependent 
variable is planned to be expanded with the help of the manipulated variable that 
will lead this research work. The latter variable will be formulated as ‘Estonia, a 
democratic, transparent, free-market state, can be chosen as a ‘gateway’ for New 
Zealand politics, business circles and the public in their endeavours to succeed in 
the post-Soviet Baltic region of the EU’. Such an approach will give a chance to 
scrutinise the studied issues comprehensively, from several angles (such as 
‘theoretical’, ‘operational’ and ‘structural’), and by answering the following three 
research questions: is it necessary for New Zealand to promote its interests and 
values in the region of the Baltic States; does an idea to choose one of the three 
Baltic States as a ‘hub’ for promoting New Zealand interests and values in the Baltic 
region of the EU have a perspective; and can Estonia be considered/recommended 
to become such a ‘hub’? 
This dissertation is among the first attempts to address a deficit of scholarship 
studying New Zealand relations with the post-Soviet Baltic region. Its findings 
could be used by both New Zealand and the Baltics’ decision-makers in the field of 
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For a geographically down-under New Zealand, a union of twenty seven European 
states is arguably a difficult matter to approach. In 2005, Phil Goff, the then 
country’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Labour-led government, 
stated that New Zealand “don’t have, and couldn’t have, established dialogues with 
all the EU members on every possible issue”.1 The undisputed fact that New 
Zealand has been known as a “distant outpost of the Western alliance”2 has not 
always made it a lot easier for the South Pacific nation in the process of dealing with 
the EU. Adding to the complexity of the problem, the EU has been constantly 
growing in size by accepting new members. The relentless geo-political LEGO-
style3 constructivism on the post-World War II European continent has paved the 
way for the six enlargements of the EU since it was initially (and surrealistically) 
established in the form of the ECSC on 18 April 1951. Moreover, the echo of the so 
called ‘British enlargement’ (1973) is very much alive in New Zealand – the country 
still remembers the large-scale economical shake-up, which followed the EU’s first 
extension.4   
 
Paradoxically, that particular enlargement gave New Zealand chances to complete a 
course of foundational studies on Europe and lose “some of dominion behavioural 
habits”5 based on what would be better and, to some extent, sarcastically described 
                                                 
1
 Phil Goff, ‘Europa Lecture. New Zealand and the EU: 12 months after enlargement’, Old Provincial 
Chamber, Christchurch, 9 May 2005.  Available from 
<http://www.europe.canterbury.ac.nz/europa/pdf/2005_goff_address.pdf>.     
2
 Anthony Wilson, New Zealand and the Soviet Union, 1950-1991: a brittle relationship (Wellington: 
Victoria University Press in association with the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2004), p. 193. 
3
 This metaphor is based on the imaginary concept that each of the 27 Member States of the EU could be seen 
as a coloured brick from a LEGO structure. LEGO is a well-known Danish enterprise that manufactures 
varieties of construction toys. See also www.lego.com.  
4
 Vlad Vernygora, ‘The EU-NZ: time to move’ in The National Business Review, 5 October 2007. Available 
from <http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/the-eu-and-nz-time-move>.    
5
 Vernygora, ‘The EU-NZ: time to move’.  
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as “tidy trading relationships with the United Kingdom”.6 Becoming “more self-
confident”,7 the South Pacific democracy had an opportunity to learn that the 
European continent “was never all about Britain”.8 At present, despite the EU is 
New Zealand’s third biggest trading partner after Australia and China, the debate 
about the better ways to be interacting with the EU is not irrelevant in New Zealand 
yet.  
 
1.1. New Zealand and the EU’s system of geo-political 
coordinates: the need to learn more about each other   
 
From the operational angle, the EU works at a “macrosociatal level” in the 
environment where the entire continent from Portugal to the Ural Mountains of 
Russia and from Norway to Azerbaijan exists as a jigsaw puzzle of several micro-
Europes as its overlapping, very different and highly regionalised pieces – “market 
Europe, social Europe, […] wealthy Europe, poorer Europe – east and west, north 
and south”.9 Not without an effort, a New Zealand-based decision maker can 
complete such a puzzle – a Britain-orientated vector still predominates among the 
other European vectors. A quantitative survey on public perceptions and media 
representation of the EU image in the Asia-Pacific region (finalised in 2005) 
showed that over 60 per cent of New Zealand respondents mentioned the UK as an 
EU Member State they have had “personal or professional connections with”.10 The 
other EU Member States (excluding the Republic of Ireland and the founding EU 
                                                 
6
 Helen Clark, ‘Europa Lecture to the National Centre for Research on Europe’, Wellington, 20 November 
2002. Available from <http://www.eucnetwork.org.nz/activities/europa/docs/2002_clark_address.pdf>.   
7
 John Key, ‘Europa Lecture: Europe’s place in New Zealand’s foreign policy’, Banquette Hall, Parliament 
Building, 12 October 2010. Available from   
<http://www.eucnetwork.org.nz/activities/europa/The%20Rt.%20Hon.%20John%20Key%2012.10.2010.pdf>  
8
 Vernygora, ‘The EU-NZ: time to move’. 
9
 Brigid Laffan, ‘The European Union and its institution as ‘identity builders’ in Transnational identities: 
becoming European in the EU, ed. by R.K. Herrmann, T. Risse and M.B. Bremer (Lanham, MD: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2004), pp. 77 and 96.   
10
 The EU through the eyes of the Asia-Pacific: public perceptions and media representations, NCRE 
Research Series 4, ed. by N. Chaban and M. Holland (Christchurch: NCRE, 2005), pp. 42-43. 
 3 
Members such as the Netherlands, Germany and France) were “largely unknown” to 
the respondents in New Zealand as well as in Australia.11 Especially this ‘unknown’ 
image was related to the lot of countries that acceded to the EU during its 
enlargement in 2004, i.e. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, and others. 
From a comparative point of view it is worthwhile mentioning that a similar survey 
conducted in 2005 in Hong Kong, a second former British dominion, showed that 
“the prominence of the UK appeared to have undermined more than contributed to 
the EU’s rating as if they were contenders”.12  At the same time, the spontaneous 
image of the EU in New Zealand was shown as overwhelmingly linked to such 
issues as “trade” and “Euro/common currency”.13  
 
Connecting the above findings in the simple logical chain and keeping in mind New 
Zealand’s healthy and stable state of relationships with the EU Member States of the 
former EU-15, it is possible to suggest that New Zealand could increasingly benefit 
from strengthening and deepening its ties with the world’s largest political and 
economic union, provided that the country becomes aware of the whole spectrum 
of different opportunities, which the enlarged supranational power and different 
regions of the EU-27 are capable to offer. In an addition, the significance of such an 
issue is understood among the EU decision makers, too. In 2003, in Wellington, 
Lord Christopher Patten, then the European Commissioner for External Relations, 
underscored the importance of increasing “awareness of the EU in New Zealand” to 
                                                 
11
 The Republic of Ireland, the Netherlands, France and Germany were mentioned in the range between 18 
and 21 percent of respondents. See ‘The EU through the eyes of the Asia-Pacific: public perceptions and 
media representations’.   
12
 Respondents were asked to determine counties or regions, which, on their opinion, are the top three most 
important partners of Hong Kong. See Kenneth Chan, ‘It’s good to talk, but it’s best to act!’, presented  29 
July 2006 at workshop EU’s new identity and its perception in Asia: responding to the 7th Framework 
Programme ‘Europe in the World’, Christchurch, New Zealand.  
Available from <http://www.ieem.org.mo/nesca/documents/papers/july2006/Chan.doc>.  
13
 The EU through the eyes of the Asia-Pacific: public perceptions and media representations, pp. 30-31. 
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be able to “bring forward the bilateral relationships, building on the existing healthy 
foundations”.14  
 
One of such foundations can undoubtedly be the people’s factor – 7.5 per cent of 
New Zealand population (‘Usually Resident Population Count, 2006) were born in 
one of the Member States of the EU-27, and almost 67 per cent of the EU-born New 
Zealand residents (202,401 people) stated England as their birthplace.15 Another 
fundamental factor to build on is that New Zealand-EU trade figures have been 
increasing from 1990 until 2008.16 All these driving forces, with necessity and 
inevitability, are directing New Zealand towards, firstly, re-discovering the enlarged 
EU as an entity and, secondly, learning about the unexplored regions of the EU 
comprehensively.   
 
In order to positively reflect to a need for New Zealand to introduce itself among the 
EU’s newcomers, this dissertation is anticipating to be of some help while New 
Zealand is trying to improve the status quo in the area of political, business, 
scientific and person-to-person relations with the strategically important Republics 
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These nations used to be treated as a “distinct […] 
Western enclave”17 in the former USSR and by now represent an integral part of the 
EU-27.  
 
Traditionally, in historiography and political science, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
have been known as the Baltic States or simply the Baltics. Regardless of the 
                                                 
14
 Christopher Patten, ‘Europa Lecture: EU-New Zealand relations after enlargement’, Parliament Building, 
Wellington, 23 April 2003. Available from 
 <http://www.eucnetwork.org.nz/activities/europa/docs/2003_patten_address.pdf>.   
15
 ‘2006 New Zealand Census’ in Statistics New Zealand. Available from 
<http://www.stats.govt.nz/census/2006-census-information-about-data/>.  
16
 ‘Trade with New Zealand’ in European Commission. Available from 
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/newzealand/index_en.htm>. See also Statistics New 
Zealand.    
17
 Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States: years of dependence, 1940-1990 (London: 
Hurst, 1993), p. 1.  
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geographical fact that the other countries of the Baltic Sea basin (namely Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Poland, Russia, and Sweden) could also be called ‘Baltic’, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are however generally considered, according to 
Reddaway, as “most “Baltic” States”18 of them all, so the non-aging terminological 
stamp ‘Baltic States’ is to be further applied in this paper to the three countries only.    
 
1.2. Introduction: the general background of the issue and the 
phenomenon under study 
 
Despite the EU-27’s true potential is yet to be discovered in full by New Zealand 
various elites and the public, the South Pacific country has already made a gigantic 
and notable step towards the new EU. In April 2005, responding to the necessity “to 
enhance [New Zealand’s] diplomatic reach into Central Europe”,19 New Zealand 
Government opened its Embassy in Warsaw with accreditation to the Baltic States. 
Having made such a diplomatic move, New Zealand de-facto recognised the 
relatively recent but dramatic changes occurred in almost every part of Europe in 25 
years. Those changes and events – the Mikhail Gorbachev era in the Soviet Union, 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the disintegration and the collapse of the USSR, the 
interconnected myriad of Yugoslavian conflicts and the establishment of the EU in 
its present form20 – gave the European continent a new regional outlook as well as 
a new set of functional dimensions.  
 
Benefiting and growing on the background of the successful “coexistence of global 
and regional multilateral institutions”,21 some of the newly-born European 
                                                 
18
 William Fiddian Reddaway, Problems of the Baltic (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1940), p. 6.  
19
 Helen Clark, ‘Address to the NZ Institute of International Affairs’, 23 June 2004. Available from 
<http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=20104>.    
20
 Some of the events mentioned in Lonnie R. Johnson, Central Europe: enemies, neighbors, friends (New 
York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 282. 
21
 Ernst B. Haas, Nationalism, liberalism, and progress (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997-2000), 
volume 2, p. 446.  
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democracies started attracting big-scale investors. For example, only the Polish state 
alone consumed over $US 100 billion of foreign direct investments (FDI) in the 
period from the early 1990s until 2007.22 Europe has got it closer to a somewhat 
controversial, phantasmagorical but nevertheless extraordinary image of the 
continent that could be genuinely united on the basis of “the broader common 
interest, served by common democratic institutions”.23 Even the potentially 
distractive and the poorly managed process of the EU’s constitualisation in 2004-
2005 could not damage this long-standing idea of Jean Monnet. By the way, the 
fairly recent developments that eventuated with the ratification of the 2007 Lisbon 
Treaty by all of the EU’s Member States show that the supranational entity may not 
need a formally written constitution to be a stronger and a more cohesive global 
power.     
 
For countries like New Zealand, the continuing process of the European integration 
certainly helps to untangle few difficult issues in the area of political economy. 
However, the numerous integrative vectors within the EU as well as its permanent 
and heavily bureaucratised inclination towards “institutional engineering”24 have not 
created a recognisable portrait of the EU even among the countries of its immediate 
neighbourhood, not to mention a group of the South Pacific states as well as 
Australia. For example, an Australian scholar Philomena Murray noted that beyond 
her country’s governmental circles and apart from recognition of the EU’s 
“economic persona”, the supranational EU “remains largely invisible on the radar 
screens of Australian elites”.25 Literally, the EU’s role in the global economy is 
                                                 
22
 ‘Foreign investors in Poland’ in Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency. Available from  
<http://www.paiz.gov.pl/publications/foreign_investors_in_poland>.  
23
 Jean Monnet, Memoirs, 1st ed. (Garden City, NY.: Doubleday, 1978), p. 523. 
24
 Jan Zielonka, ‘Europe as Empire – Reflections of the 50th Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome’, Lecture 
presented at University of Auckland, 15 May 2007. 
25
 Philomena Murray, ‘What Australians think about the EU’ in The European Union and the Asia–Pacific: 
media, public and elite perceptions of the EU, ed. N. Chaban and M. Holland (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 
p. 179.   
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currently a lot more visible than its potential and capability shown by the EU on the 
stage of the international politics.  
 
In May 2005, Goff underlined this particular obstacle in an explicit way: 
I might pick up the phone and call Javier Solana. But even if I convince him, I 
haven’t necessarily convinced the EU. Rather, his voice is one among many, and 
his is not necessarily the final decision.26   
 
Undoubtedly, the EU’s image is becoming more distinct in the light of the adoption 
of the Lisbon Treaty and the following November 2009 elections of the President of 
the EU’s Council and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
At the same time, Herman Van Rompuy, the newly elected President of the Council 
of the EU, outlined his desire “to listen to everyone and […] make sure that […] 
deliberations turn into results for everyone”.27 Thus, if we are to generalise on the 
broader area of interactions, as suggested, it is noticeably easier for New Zealand at 
present to cooperate with the EU Member States, especially with the Union’s 
newcomers, “in the context of dealing with those countries’ historical regions”.28 
That is why the fact of distinguishing Poland and the Baltic trio from the other 
newcomers to the EU had given an impression that the post-Cold War relationships-
building process with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland had not been launched 
by New Zealand in the inertial ‘just in case’ framework. Notably, the prime-role of 
the official Brussels certainly has been acknowledged by New Zealand officials in 
the past (via Ministerial Troika consultations and regular contacts with the President 
of the European Commission and the EU High Representative). But nevertheless the 
precedent with establishing the Warsaw Embassy is a definite sign of New 
                                                 
26
 Goff, ‘Europa Lecture’.  
27
 Herman Van Rompuy, ‘Summary: 19 November 2009, Brussels – Intervention of H.E. Mr. Herman Van 
Rompuy following his appointment as President of the Council of the European Union’. Available from 
<http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_9245_en.htm>.    
28
 Vernygora, ‘The EU-NZ: Time to Move’. 
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Zealand’s positive mood about future cooperation with the newer parts of the EU. 
‘How to cooperate?’ is a different story.     
 
In the last seven years there were several high-level visits to the Poland-Baltic States 
region made by New Zealand governmental and parliamentary officials, including 
New Zealand Prime Minister’s visit to Poland (2005), Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade’s visits to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (2004), New Zealand 
Parliament’s Speaker’s visits to Estonia and Latvia (2004) and to Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary (2008) and Minister of Foreign Affairs’ visit to Estonia 
(2006).  
 
In search for knowledge about the new Europe, the country’s political summit has 
been strongly supported by New Zealand academia. In 2000, the Centre for 
Research on Europe (now known as the NCRE) was founded at the University of 
Canterbury to quickly gain national status and become an internationally renowned 
EU-dedicated tertiary level academic centre.29 In 2004, it was recognised by the EU 
as a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence.30 In the period from 2000 until 2010, the 
NCRE together with the New Zealand EU Centres Network (NZ EUCN) have 
organised a significant number of international conferences and high-profile open 
lectures (‘Europa Lecture’) with a distinct emphasis on the EU enlargements and 
research on the EU’s new Members.31 More often than in had been before, the wider 
New Zealand public started seeing leaders of European states, the EU 
Commissionaires and local politicians giving speeches on the EU-New Zealand 
cooperation and Europe-related matters. This kind of dynamics showed that New 
Zealand, driven by a desire to strengthen its presence in the area or/and gain some 
                                                 
29
 National Centre for Research on Europe (home webpage) in the University of Canterbury official web 
portal. Available from <http://www.europe.canterbury.ac.nz/info/ncre.shtml>.    
30
 ‘Professor Martin Holland’ in Jean Monnet: Success Stories – Europe for lifelong learning (Luxemburg: 
Office for Official Publications of the European communities, 2007), p. 22. See also <http://www.jmcoe-asia-
pacific.org/>.   
31
 National Centre for Research on Europe. See <http://www.europe.canterbury.ac.nz/conferences/> and 
<http://www.europe.canterbury.ac.nz/publications/>.    
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knowledge about the area, started searching for opportunities in the newer parts of 
the EU.       
 
Assuming that the European statehoods are generally opened or “positively exposed 
to New Zealand”,32 too, and intending to establish a clear concept for activities in 
the future, this research work will be making ‘snap-shots’ of the status quo and 
assessing some key factors that are likely to assist in regards of enhancing New 
Zealand’s interconnections with the Baltic States. Characteristically for the 
dissertation, the example of the Republic of Estonia, a country of a land mass 
similar to Switzerland or the Netherlands, will be tested as a possible 
formal/informal gateway for New Zealand undertaking its most recent endeavours 
towards discovering the Baltics in a comprehensive way.  
 
Back in April 1979, for the then New Zealand Ambassador in the USSR Jim Weir 
Estonia appeared to be similar to Scandinavia; the New Zealand diplomat 
“encountered nothing so sophisticated anywhere else in the Soviet Union”33 as he 
saw in Estonia. Some experts also argued that Estonia “was the most liberal part”34 
of the former USSR. According to O’Connor, Estonia was also seen as “bulwark of 
stability and […] the driving force behind the efforts of the Baltic countries to forge 
closer ties with European institutions”.35  
 
In the present days, as noted by Christine Spahn from New Zealand Trade and 
Enterprise, the Estonian state “is seen as the champion”36 among the Baltic trio. A 
                                                 
32
 Richard Laverty, ‘Speech’ at Europe Series – ‘New governance, new opportunities and new partnerships’, 
Trade and Investment Session, Fale Pasifika, University of Auckland, 19 March 2007.   
33
 Jim Weir, A New Zealand Ambassador’s letters from Moscow (Auckland, London, Sydney, Toronto: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1988), p. 265. 
34
 Mikk Titma and Andu Rammer, ‘Changing value patterns in a divided society’, Chapter 11 Estonia in 
Democracy and political culture in Eastern Europe, ed. by H-D. Klingemann, D. Fuchs and J. Zielonka 
(Routledge, 2006), p.305. 
35
 Kevin O’Connor, Culture and customs of the Baltic States (Westport, Connecticut; London: Greenwood 
Press, 2006), pp. 31-32. 
36
 Christine Spahn, interview with author, 10 January 2008.  
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2009 New Zealand scholarly edition37 was entirely dedicated to Estonia and its 
economic success. In 2006, John Tierney of The New York Times referred to the pre-
recessional Estonia as to “the Baltic Tiger”, while describing Tallinn, the country’s 
capital city, as “a boomtown” where “Prague meets Houston, except that Houston’s 
economy is cool by comparison”.38 Since 1991, Estonia is indeed continuing to 
perform better than Latvia and Lithuania in many aspects of political, economic and 
social life. 
 
Such and similar statements as well as this paper’s findings that could strongly 
argue in favour of the ‘Estonian hub’ for New Zealand do not undermine 
possibilities and perspectives for Latvia and Lithuania to become one. Riga and 
Vilnius, should they maintain their growing geo-political and sub-regional 
importance and should the three Baltic republics continue being perceived 
worldwide as a region, can ruthlessly challenge the Tallinn’s informal leading role 
in the nearest future. At this point, the choice of the ‘Estonia-based hub’, provided it 
is ever made by New Zealand, seems rather obvious but still needs to be critically 
tested – one of this paper’s tasks to complete.               
 
As it has been briefly discussed before, the post-Soviet democracies of the Baltic 
States together with majority of the other newcomers to the EU are not among the 
better known partners of New Zealand. Nevertheless, the New Zealand political 
elites (not an average New Zealander though) had certainly had some awareness of 
the specific national makeup of the former USSR. To some extent and to a certain 
point in history, the Baltic region of the collapsed communist political empire had 
been distinguished by New Zealand foreign policy makers from the lot of the titular 
Soviet Republics. In 1940, the year when Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were 
                                                 
37
 See David G. Mayes ed., Microfoundations of economic success. Lessons from Estonia (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2009). 
38
 John Tierney, ‘New Europe’s boomtown’ in The New York Times, 5 September 2006. Available from 
<http://select.nytimes.com/2006/09/05/opinion/05tierney.html?_r=1&oref=slogin>.    
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occupied by the USSR (an aftermath of the Molotov-Ribbentrop secret protocol to 
the Soviet-German pact singed on 23 August 1939 and, more specifically, the 
Soviet-German state borders agreement singed on 28 September 1939), the New 
Zealand’s wartime Government condemned those countries’ “forcible 
incorporation”39 into the Soviet Union. Only thirty four years later, New Zealand, 
desperately searching for new markets at a very difficult time and thus reflecting to 
the realistic need of maintaining “a growing trade relationship” 40 with the Soviet 
Moscow, officially recognised the Soviet Union’s jurisdiction under the Baltic 
States and re-established its diplomatic representation in the Soviet capital.41   
 
This fact of New Zealand’s long-term refusal to formally recognise the Soviet 
annexation of the Baltics can become a valuable starting point in building up 
relationships with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from self-re-introduction, but 
definitely not from the ‘ground zero’.    
 
1.3. Main variables of the study and its theoretical background  
 
According to the above, this dissertation’s dependent (response) variable can be 
outlined as ‘New Zealand multi-dimensional interactions with the post-Soviet Baltic 
Republics, particularly with the Republic of Estonia’. At the same time, the 
descriptive (and therefore semantically quasi-simplistic) nature of the dependent 
variable is planned to be expanded with the help of the manipulated variable that 
will lead this research work. The latter variable will be formulated as ‘Estonia, a 
democratic, transparent, free-market state, can be chosen as a gateway for New 
                                                 
39
 Wilson, p. 74. 
40
 Wilson, p. 74. 
41
 Vladimir Oltarzhevskiy, Sovetskiy Soyuz i Novaya Zelandiya v sisteme mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy 40-80 
godov XX veka (Irkutsk: Ottisk, 1999), p. 178.   
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Zealand politics, business, scientific circles and the public in their endeavours 
to succeed in the post-Soviet Baltic region of the EU’.  
 
Such an approach will give a chance to scrutinise the studied issues from several 
angles (namely ‘theoretical’, ‘operational’ and ‘structural’), and by answering the 
following three research questions: is it necessary for New Zealand to promote its 
image, business interests, scientific achievements and political values in the less 
known region of the Baltic States; does an idea to choose one of the three Baltic 
States as a ‘hub’ for promoting New Zealand’s image, business interests, 
scientific achievements and political values in the Baltic region of the EU have a 
perspective; and can Estonia be considered/recommended to become such a 
‘hub’? Importantly, each of the research questions will be approached from its own 
theoretical, structural and operational angles, thus producing a pattern for similar 
studies in the future and helping to determine a set of tendencies that could be found 
elsewhere, i.e. while analysing Latvia- or Lithuania-related issues.  
 
In addition, a ‘hub’/’gateway’ concept is understood here as an idea to choose 
(formally or informally) the best possible place in a given region, which is the most 
advantageous to be serving as a base for establishing one’s stable presence in the 
area.        
In conjunction to the main variables of the dissertation, there are some important 
moderators of the studying process, such as:   
- The fifth enlargement of the EU (when Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined the 
EU on 1 May 2004); 
- New elements to New Zealand foreign policy expressed in New Zealand’s recent 
interest towards Eastern, Central Europe and Scandinavia; 
 13 
- New Zealand’s and Estonia’s acknowledged successes in being among the world’s 
leading nations in such high-validity surveys as ‘Global Press Freedom Survey’, 
‘Index of Economic Freedom’, ‘World Bank’s Countries’ Business Climate 
Survey’, many others. Moreover and remarkably for the two small countries, some 
comprehensive surveys (the inaugural 2006 ‘State of World Liberty Index’ and 
‘Transparency International Corruption Perception Indexes 2006-2010) 
correspondingly showed Estonia and New Zealand as world leaders in their 
respective rankings. 
At the same time, there is a certain need to be aware of some intervening variables, 
which attempt to edge their ways into relationships between dependent and 
manipulated variables as well as moderators of this research work. One of such 
variables, in spite of its extremely hypothetical nature, does not undermine the fact 
of necessity but conceptually (and provocatively) questions the prospects of 
objective feasibility for New Zealand and the Baltics to smoothly realise their 
‘interaction-building’ capacities. From the other flank, the second intervening 
variable may not be entirely in favour of the idea of the ‘Estonian hub’ offering 
Latvia’s or/and Lithuania’s vectors instead. Alternatively, Poland that hosts New 
Zealand’s diplomatic representatives in the region can be offered as an existing 
‘hub’ that perhaps needs some further development and additional resources to be 
more productive and proactive.  
In the light of the opening of New Zealand Embassy in Stockholm in 2008, there 
may be a symbiotic variation of the above two variables that may question the very 
existence of the Baltics’ region itself – pointing on Estonia-Finland-Scandinavia, 
Latvia-Germany, and Lithuania-Poland-Belarus-Ukraine ties that perhaps could 
hold a lot more regional potential than the supposedly obvious Estonia-Latvia-
Lithuania axis. Clearly, the current situation has not changed much from the times 
of the League of Nations (the first half of the twentieth century) when Estonia, 
 14 
Latvia and Lithuania were perceived as some kind of a grouping, even though they 
had not always been acting as one.42 Some of the experts even argued that the pre-
World War II independence period led to the rise of “Baltic affinity that obscured 
the fundamental differences between Estonia and Latvia on one hand and Lithuania 
on the other”.43 However, this paper’s choice to get the three Baltic States 
informally regionalised for one more time is not based on a simplified perception 
that makes Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania look the same. On the contrary, it is 
accompanied by the integrated assumption of administrative, cultural, economical 
and political differences between each of the Baltics. Therefore, it is not suggested 
for New Zealand, while having interacted with Estonia, to take identical approach 
dealing with Latvia or Lithuania.          
Finalising on the intervening variables, in general, their major hint is that New 
Zealand's interest towards the Baltics via Estonia as well as the Baltic trio’s 
curiosity towards the South Pacific via New Zealand may not be of the ‘prime-level’ 
importance and may be overshadowed by existing working relationships with the 
others, namely Australia, the EU-15, the United States, the Asia-Pacific (for New 
Zealand) and the EU-15 and the Russian Federation (for Estonia and the other two 
Baltics).  
 
On the other side, there is a strong theoretical background that supports the 
manipulated variable of this study. For example, the Baltic States have already 
started showing certain signs of classic functionalist strategy in the broader sense 
that is not only related to the European integration – by promoting and developing 
“shared identities” and getting involved into “cross state cooperation on a series of 
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Baltic Studies, 1988), p.298.  
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functional matters”.44 In this framework, New Zealand, one of the most stable 
Western-style democracies, is not likely to suddenly get engaged into a ‘clash of 
civilizations’ while dealing with the relatively inexperienced but undoubtedly 
transparent democratic and free-market polities of the Baltic region.45 The latter 
statement has a solid normative basis – prior to joining the EU, the Baltics and the 
other seven newcomers had to formally meet the Copenhagen Criteria and provide 
sufficient evidences that their state institutions were capable in guaranteeing 
democracy, rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities.46 
Additionally, not only did the Baltics successfully reach the goal of joining the EU, 
but they also became full members of NATO and WTO where normative criteria are 
no less strict than in the EU. In case of Estonia, the country has already made a step 
further becoming a member of the OECD, a club of the world’s most developed 
states.  
Moreover, and this is another crucial theoretical argument, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania will be making it even easier for New Zealand to approach them – 
sometimes their reflections to act in a distinct ‘intergovernmental’ way make the 
Baltics significantly more ‘distinguishable’ among the other newcomers to the EU. 
According to Vernygora and Chaban, whilst the EU’s classic and powerful 
democracies are slowly but surely leaning towards “less sovereignty and more 
supranational institutions”,47 the new Member States (including the Baltics) still 
need some time to recover from having a vulnerable “secondary status”48 that they 
had during their ‘have been’ times within the USSR, once described as the 
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“Russian-dominated Soviet state”.49 Without excessive overemphasising the factor 
of the then existed hierarchical ladder of nations of the former USSR,50 the 
unshakable Russian national domination in the Soviet Union had to be treated as an 
empirical assumption. It led to the situation when the distinction between the USSR 
and the Russian Federation within it became “fuzzy and often unrecognizable”,51 
making the other titular Republics – even Belarus and Ukraine, the inaugural 
members of the United Nations – politically and geographically faceless.  
 
The period when a neighbouring political regime could easily make decisions on the 
fate of the then independent Baltic societies and their leaders52 is still well-
remembered in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Ortvin Sarapu, an Estonian post-
World War II refugee who later became New Zealand’s greatest chess player, wrote 
with sadness that both the Nazi and Soviet armies (objectively, the occupying 
totalitarian powers) positioned themselves as liberators.53 There is also a collective 
memory about the local ‘prisoners of conscience’ or simply political prisoners held 
by the Soviet regime in 1960s-80s. Some of them like Soldatov, Sadunaite and 
Ziukauskas were mentioned in Andrei Sakharov’s Nobel Lecture in 1975 – the most 
famous of all Russian dissidents wanted those people to share with him the honour 
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of The Nobel Peace Prize.54 Sergei Soldatov, an associate professor at the Tallinn 
University of Technology and one of the leading personalities of the dissident 
movement in Estonia that demanded the restoration of the independent Estonian 
Republic, was arrested by the KGB in January 1975.55 At the same time, even the 
influential Soviet leaders like Eduard Shevardnadze were certain that the Baltic 
States “were not the place where nationalism would turn violent”.56 
 Furthermore, as it was noted and framed by the media in New Zealand and some of 
the other Asia-Pacific countries, “the novelty and uniqueness of the 2004 EU 
enlargement”57 could not hide the ambivalent imagery of the situation. The 
dominant feeling was that the EU’s doors “were only half-opened and embraces 
half-hearted” for the Baltics and the other new Members of the EU.58 In the 
dramatically enlarged European supranational entity, the fear of uncertainly (“what 
might come”)59 was mixed with the joy of celebration. At a certain point in time, 
New Zealand reporters on the 2004 EU’s enlargement created predominantly a 
negatively-charged image of the process, using metaphors that could be 
conceptualised in the following groups: “too far too soon”, “physical barriers”, 
“fortress Europe”, “problems in the neighbourhood”, “poorer cousins and unhappy 
family”, “poor health” others.60 After such a critical ‘feedback’ received from 
‘within the new family’ and the foreign ‘spectators’, the Baltics had a lot to prove. 
These were and are the prime reasons for the Baltic States, while being consistently 
in favour of the European integration in principle, to continue shaping their very 
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own geo-political silhouettes based on successful past experience of establishing 
their very own nation-states, some of them with ancient roots.61 For example, the 
historical fact of Lithuania’s capability to grow, although with significant Slavic 
influence, into an independent power in the Middle Ages62 has tremendously 
boosted the country’s state-building process at present. In fact, each of the Baltic 
States never accepted that “their pre- [Second World] war statehood[s] w[ere] ever 
extinguished”.63 Elaborating on the same issue, Hiden and Salmon ironically noted 
that, right before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Baltics needed an 
informational office “to counter damaging misconceptions, among these the 
assumption that ‘tiny’ Baltic countries are unable to survive on their own”.64      
Evidently, promoting themselves as independent countries, the Baltics have also 
been mastering their skill as regional experts within the EU and outside of the EU. 
The trio’s active role in the process of regional development, their participation in 
the Baltic Assembly and the Community of Democratic Choice (all to be briefly 
discussed at length) brought up arguments about a new wave of regionalism in the 
Eastern Europe,65 backed by and “contextualised within a profoundly altered 
development paradigm”.66 The revival of neo-regionalism suggests that Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania are taking additional chances to stay in the front row of 
international politics in order to be distinctly heard by partners as different as New 
Zealand, Australia, Canada, Russia, the United States, China, Georgia or Ukraine. 
Also, the knowledge of their immediate and broader regions that is being offered by 
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the Baltics is something too important to be overlooked or ignored by the others in 
the globalised world that has been currently experiencing a challenging period of 
economic recession.      
 
1.4. Methodological concept of the study   
 
This dissertation’s method of investigation will be based on collecting evidence and 
ideas in order to analyse and test their theoretical, structural and operational validity 
in relationships to the chosen lot of research questions.   
 
Theoretical dimension of analysis is employed to pick out a concept that is 
suggested to have direct relevance to a particular research question, and then 
combine it a larger framework where majority of interactions under study occur or 
may occur.  
 
Structural dimension is understood here as a tool to take a snap-shot of the status 
quo. It is a dimension of a static nature that allows scrutinising the settings, 
numerous elements of political, business and social cultures, legal structure, proven 
qualities of a subject as well as visible potential to react in accordance to the rules.   
     
Operational dimension has a definite nature of dynamics. Its ‘lenses’ are to be set 
up to see how well the paradigm under study realises its potential while working 
within the static set of coordinates and responding to the dissertation’s research 
questions. This dimension is planned to be a methodological tool in finalising the 
paper’s outcome from a practical point of view. For example, a perspective 
interaction may not be compatible to the existing (possibly immature) framework 
that may show some degree of operational immobility, lack of desire, negative 
attitude or even total incapability for further development.     
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As this dissertation is among the first attempts to address a deficit of scholarship 
studying New Zealand relations with the post-Soviet Baltic region, a number of 
studies on similar sets of interactions are to be taken into account as useful 
exploratory tools.  
 
The data for this dissertation was obtained from multiple primary and secondary 
sources employing a variety of methods of data collection with an emphasis on 
conducting semi-structural (in person) and structural (by e-mail) interviews with key 
informants in New Zealand and the Baltic States, retaining the records of the 
interviews. Thoughts, personal opinions and ideas expressed by a number of 
interviewees representing elites (politicians, businessmen, diplomats and scientists) 
and students who agreed to answer questions from standard questionnaires (see 
Appendix 1 and 2),67 are extrapolated on each of the three research questions. A list 
of interviewees was initially created to reflect equal representation of the two 
geographical sides on the basis of mirroring a counterpart’s position/level/societal 
status whenever it was possible. Being structured and administered in a similar way, 
the questionnaires were however deliberately differentiated by the first and the last 
questions. More specifically, each of the interviewees from the New Zealand side 
had been asked about Estonia’s perspective to become a New Zealand ‘hub’ in the 
Baltic, while the Baltic interviewees were given an option to choose from Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania. Neither of the respondents was advised about the title of the 
research paper, its variables and moderators. Also, the formal request to participate 
in the survey was ensured to have the same look for both sides.  
 
Several institutions of higher education in the Baltics and New Zealand were asked 
to distribute the questionnaires among local students (both undergraduates and post-
graduates, but strictly citizens of a corresponding country) learning International 
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Relations, or Political Science, or Area Studies, or Business, or Public 
Administration.  
 
The following educational institutions agreed to participate in the survey and 
provided significant support – the International University Audentes68 (Estonia), 
Tallinn University (Estonia), the Vidzeme University College (Latvia), the Mykolas 
Romeris University (Vilnius, Lithuania) and the University of Canterbury (New 
Zealand). Table 1 indicates the number of people responded to the questionnaires 
(separated by country and group type). Appendix 3 provides information on the 
names, positions (at time of the interview) and countries of the elites’ 
representatives.     
 
Table 1: Number of Interviewees by Country and Group Type   
 
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania New Zealand  Total  
Elites  10 2 2 8 22 
Students 6 4 12 11 33 
Total 16 6 14 19 55 
 
Finally, the significance of this research work is in exploring an area of New 
Zealand political studies neglected in the past and contributing to the development 
of the Baltics-New Zealand relations on a new quality level. Although this research 
is planned to be conducted primarily in New Zealand and for New Zealand, its 
conclusions and findings could be used and appreciated by both New Zealand and 
Estonian-Latvian-Lithuanian decision-makers in the field of international relations. 
This dissertation may also and with necessity lead to a ‘reverse effect’ in 
interactions when New Zealand may be chosen as a friendly and an easily accessible 
‘hub’ for promoting the Baltic States’ interests in the South Pacific region. Also, this 
paper’s methodological approach, within a certain framework, could be partially or 
even entirely used for similar investigations in the field.     
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2. Is it necessary to be known better?   
 
 
In June 2007, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External 
Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, delivered a strong message on the 
need of “upgrading [the EU-New Zealand] relations, to better reflect the sort of 
relationship we’d like to have”.69 The EU Commissioner clearly mapped the three 
key segments where the two parties “want to do more together”, namely “boosting 
trade and investment, improving security in the Pacific region, and tackling the 
global issues of energy security and climate change”.70  
 
In the logical line with the latter statement, the following September 2007 Joint 
Declaration on Relations and Cooperation signed between New Zealand and the EU 
in Lisbon was provisionally intended to reinforce the process of increasing 
“practical cooperation in areas of mutual interest”.71 The main emphasis of the 
document was indisputably on “[t]rade and economic links”, which were described 
as “fundamental to the sound relationship overall”.72 This and the other provisions 
of the document led the then New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters to 
comment at a time on the Declaration’s “strong forward-looking element”.73   
 
With a high number of new Member States having joined the EU since 2004 (the 
year of the latest declarative agreement between the supranational Union and New 
Zealand), the EU is in permanent need to keep reloading its operational capacity in 
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order to exhibit it in front of existing and perspective partners located outside of 
European continent.  
 
Arguably, the deepening and widening cooperation with New Zealand is helping the 
EU to introduce its neophytes’ potential to a reliable partner with “close historical, 
political, economic and cultural connections”.74 In February 2009, this intention was 
verbally framed by Jose Manuel Barroso, the European Commission President, 
whose proposal of exploring “a broad and comprehensive agreement encompassing 
common values” was welcomed by the current New Zealand Prime Minister John 
Key.75 Aiming to build on the 2007 Declaration, the New Zealand leader saw the 
future agreement as a “logical and desirable next step for a relationship of such 
significance”.76             
 
For the South Pacific side, a set of new arrangements with the EU means a set of 
new opportunities in the less familiar parts of the vast European supranational 
establishment. It goes smoothly with New Zealand’s focus on promoting its image, 
values and achievements in order to find new markets and new reliable partnerships. 
This statement is evidently supported by a former New Zealand Ambassador to the 
Baltic States (1992-1994, based in Moscow) Gerald McGhie who, expressing his 
personal opinion, acknowledged New Zealand’s ever-present intention to be 
“looking to develop new markets”.77 The hardship of the post-1973 period is 
remembered in the country, but New Zealand, while overcoming its “invariably 
negative”78 attitude towards the EU’s predecessor, has learned the lesson and 
managed to remarkably diversify its politico-economical vectors since then. Proving 
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the latter and underscoring his country’s new vision on the post-Cold War Europe, 
Winston Peters stated in June 2008 that “the European market does not begin and 
end in Britain”.79 
 
Considering the above, the question of a need to discover a strategically important 
group of the EU’s newcomers – the Baltics – with obvious intentions to make a 
proper introduction and experience the area first-hand might look for some 
policymakers as increasingly rhetoric and even academically naïve. In reality, a  
closer look at opportunities for New Zealand in the Baltic States is still required 
 
The general argument of the EU’s importance for New Zealand can certainly switch 
the engine of curiosity on and keep it going for some time, but it can hardly lead a 
New Zealand decision maker any further. For him or her, the talk is not about the 
enlarged EU in general – its immense significance for New Zealand is never to be 
questioned – but about a region of the EU that happened to be one of the least 
known to New Zealand. One does not have to go too far to prove it. Back in the 
1920s, the newly independent Estonia, Latvia and Estonia did not carry a lot of 
weight in the British foreign policy,80 not to mention the foreign policies of the 
British dominions, including New Zealand. The legacy of the past has its traces at 
present. According to Tõnu Loorpärg, the Honourary Consul of Estonia in 
Wellington, New Zealanders (elites included) often confuse the ‘Baltic’ with 
‘Balkans’.81 Also, there is a problem of using the term of ‘Baltics’/’Baltic States’ 
being wrongly perceived as “some sort of union”,82 repeating the same pattern as of 
1920s when the three Baltic States were treated by the British Foreign Office “as a 
whole”.83  
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With the help of the previously described multidimensional analytical approach – 
the correlation of theoretical, structural and operational dimensions – this chapter 
of the dissertation will be testing the factor of the justified necessity for New 
Zealand to discover the Baltic States directly. So, is it really necessary for the 
former British dominion in the South Pacific to promote its image, business 
interests, scientific achievements and political values in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania?        
 
2.1. Theoretical dimension: the wounded globalisation and the 
re-birth of classic functionalism      
 
Both New Zealand and the Baltic States are parts of the globalised world. Indeed, 
among the myriads of positive names, trends and brands, there are some that are 
distinctly associated with one of the four countries – Anchor butter, Riga sprats, 
Skype, flat tax, Arvidas Sabonis, the Baltic amber, the Vilnius Conference, the 
kiwifruits, the All Blacks, and the Singing Revolution others. Each of these 
examples is known globally, 1) successfully making the image of a locality of its 
origin, 2) formally or informally acting as a representative of a country, 3) helping 
to produce similar trends and brands elsewhere, and, in some cases, 4) offering 
solutions to a problem. At the same time, the fundamental complexity of the present 
time is underscored by the argument that the globalised environment is not the only 
available framework to succeed in; otherwise the suggestion about the increasingly 
rising profile of “participatory alternatives within the global countermovement”84 
would have been baseless. The world’s most recent economic downturn that started 
in 2008 has arguably damaged the somewhat mythological image of the ever-
successful globalisation.  
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Certainly, the formal definition of the globalisation can significantly vary, 
depending on how to treat the phenomenon – as “a process, an organising principle, 
an outcome, a conjuncture, or a project”.85 When brought down to reality, both 
terminology and practical tools that are generally accepted only in the context of a 
particular interaction, could have been successfully used (entirely or partially) to 
analyse a much broader framework and to give a comprehensive solution to a global 
problem. However, what was/is supposed to be tackled with a unified global 
response was/is getting fixed with the help of a number of disintegrated moves made 
by different counties, institutions and regions, enlightening us to the current 
situation all countries have to face. The diminishing role of the G-8 (according to 
Joschka Fisher it has already been “dismissed by history”)86 the ‘silence’ of the UN, 
and the growing appearance of the G-20 are indicators of global coordination (or 
discoordination). In the Asia-Pacific vast region, New Zealand’s ‘home ground’, 
some observers already noted the APEC’s “credibility problem”87 that putting the 
organisation’s relevance “under question”.88       
 
Issued by the Bank of England, the estimate of US$ 2.8 trillion for total global 
losses in the financial industry during the 2008 market turmoil89 was an additional 
proof that globalisation, perhaps in visible contradiction to its own natural goal to 
generate and generalise both standards and thoughts, did not produce a globally 
accepted working mechanism on how to solve the planetary politico-economical 
crisis of relationships.      
 
Apparently, the current situation is a good time for both scholars and practitioners to 
seek some non-standard approaches in analysing the present. In our case, it is 
                                                 
85
 McMichael, p. 587.   
86
 Joschka Fisher, ‘Up and over the wall and then the rest in history’ in The Dominion Post, 4 November 
2009, B7.  
87
 John Armstrong, ‘A summit in search of identity’ in The New Zealand Herald, 12 November 2009, A2. 
88
 John Armstrong. 
89
 ‘Bad Vibrations’ in The Economist, 30 October 2008. Available from 
<http://www.economist.com/finance/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=12516680>.    
 27 
possible to argue that the European-South Pacific cooperation and its outcomes – at 
the moment and in the future, in the times of global success or global recession – are 
to be better understood, explained, forecasted and framed within the functions-
driven process. This process can certainly be globalised in its nature, but locally 
characterised in its outcome.  
 
In 2008, according to The International Herald Tribune, the Baltic States were 
experiencing “their first serious economic downturn” since restoring independence 
in 1990s.90 The New Zealand economy is officially in recession as well. But it is 
true, too, that the global financial crisis had made both New Zealand’s and the 
Baltics’ entrepreneurship a lot more innovative and no less optimistic. Marje Josing, 
Director of the Estonian Institute for Economic Research, argued in October 2008 
that “[a] little real-life pressure won’t hurt”.91 A year later, the experts of the same 
institution concluded that the “deterioration of the economic that has continued for 
nine quarters in a row has come to an end”.92   
 
After all, despite globalisation is increasingly seen in some places as “a direct threat 
to traditional ways of living, national identity and democracy”,93 the return to “life 
within national borders”94 seems like the last of all possible scenarios to be ever 
considered by “multinational firms and transnational nongovernmental groups”.95 In 
this sense, functionalism could be found as a provider of necessary linkages to bring 
prospective interactions into existence and make existing interactions stronger or 
successfully recovered. In our case, functionalism could establish a roadmap for the 
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potentially long-term partnership between New Zealand and the Baltics, giving the 
process a needed ‘kick-off’.  
 
For New Zealand, due to the country’s geographical but not political, economical or 
ideological isolation from the EU, the emergence of the Baltics behind the EU’s 
“Golden Curtain”96 is suggested to be noticed in the global context firstly (and 
primarily) and in the European framework, secondly. In other words, and this a 
part of the argument to be discussed further, the democratic and transparent 
Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian ‘puzzles’ of the EU’s grand picture are logical and 
easy-to-deal-with partners for New Zealand. Presently, regardless of its 
diversification and relative stability in the sphere of economic cooperation with the 
rest of the world, New Zealand is interested in getting favourable attention outside 
of its traditional circle of well-known partners, and let us prove it.  
 
2.1.1. The global context        
 
Back in 1932, Mitrany argued that the process of transferring functions from the 
local field to the international level is generally faster than the “corresponding 
change in legal doctrine”.97 This classic argument is as valid as ever in nowadays. 
More specifically, the mechanisms of functional spillover, with their overwhelming 
emphasis on economic policies,98 are naturally represented in foreign policies and 
on the broad societal level, too. Marko Mihkelson, the Chairman of the EU Affairs 
Committee of the Estonian parliament, stated the following: 
In our world, there are many dynamic issues we must react on and in close 
cooperation with many countries. This is a natural part of our foreign policy agenda 
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to be more global [to be able] to reach more countries and establish closer relations 
with nations whose views are similar to ours.99      
 
Such a statement can lead to a suggestion that there is no real need for both New 
Zealand and the Baltics to have a great deal of ‘homework’ done prior to getting 
engaged by various cooperative links. Indeed, the initial steps towards each other 
could be made, according to Smith, without having “institutional structures, or even 
in the absence of deliberate efforts to coordinate policy”.100 This is where a potential 
partner’s reputable status plays its important role, and the issue of geographic 
isolation immediately becomes somewhat secondary or irrelevant.  
 
New Zealand is arguably a well-respected country among the Baltic States. The 
following three examples are to illustrate such sentiments towards New Zealand 
expressed by high-ranked officials in each of the Baltic States. Talking on the 
subject, Mart Laar, the former Prime Minister of Estonia,101 stated that New 
Zealand’s reputation “is positive as one of the radical reformers in the world”.102 
According to Indulis Bērziņš, the former Foreign Minister of Latvia, his country 
sees New Zealand “as partners and experts in the [Pacific] region”.103 On her turn, 
Diana Mickevičienė, Director of the Asia Pacific Division of the Lithuanian Foreign 
Ministry, argued that “New Zealand’s reputation in Lithuania is very high” adding 
that it is “considered a like-minded country, also very much respected for her 
successful agricultural policies”.104 To sum up on the matter, it is empirically 
evident that the Baltic States would have welcomed ‘more of New Zealand’s 
presence’ in their region, should it want to become a lot more ‘visible’ for Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania.          
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As for New Zealand, historically, a potential partner’s reliability is among the most 
important qualities it is searching for. For example, the country takes certain pride in 
its long-term participation in the OECD. It is a typical working example of 
functionalism that, using Mitrany’s other classic expression, is trying to take care 
“of the common material needs”105 of members. Importantly, as suggested by Saar, 
the OECD as a “global advisory forum […] cannot be biased”.106  
 
Apart from an intention to make its own voice heard and to learn from different 
countries’ experiences,107 New Zealand’s relationships with the other members of 
the OECD are arguably highlighted by a degree of stability as well as general 
predictability. Therefore the green light given in December 2007 to Estonia for the 
start of accession talks with the OECD108 – it was a clear sign of the Baltic country’s 
good perspectives on the global arena – could have become an additional strong 
signal for the official Wellington to go ahead with enhancing cooperation with 
official Tallinn and/or perhaps with the Baltics via Tallinn. Having “reformed its 
economy rapidly, successfully and thoroughly”, Estonia’s declared intention (as a 
perspective OECD member) “is not only learn from others, but […] to share”109 
also. On 10 May 2010, the process eventuated with the Estonian state (together with 
Slovenia and Israel) being officially invited to join the OECD.110 
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Generally, an OECD country is where business enjoys business-friendly regulations. 
As a top performer in world ranking on the ease of doing business, New Zealand 
entrepreneurship may have already noticed that the Baltic States would be 
constantly ranked among the countries with transparent and efficient business 
regulations, too (see Table 2 below).  
 
Table 2: Ranking On the Ease of Doing Business111   
Year/country 2007 2008 2009 2010 
New Zealand 2 2 2 2 
United Kingdom 6 6 6 5 
United States 3 3 3 4 
Estonia 17 17 22 24 
Latvia 24 22 29 27 
Lithuania 16 26 28 26 
Poland 75 74 76 72 
Georgia 37 18 15 11 
Russia 96 106 120 120 
 
2.1.2. The Baltics in the EU-New Zealand framework – an addition to the 
existing geo-political vocabulary  
 
The current geo-political status-quo represents the Baltics as an integral part of the 
EU. Thus New Zealand, interacting with the EU, directly and indirectly does it with 
the Baltic States as well. The contrary works in the identical way – New Zealand’s 
steps towards Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania are the steps towards the EU as a whole. 
Given the fact that the Baltics of the EU are operationally more capable and 
sophisticated than the Baltics on their own, this kind of a contemporary framework 
makes the process both simpler and a lot more complicated in the same time. In our 
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particular case, this type of bilateralism appears to have a distinct dualistic nature as 
each of the Baltics is an independent state and the EU is an internationally 
recognised supranational body.  
 
A factor that brings some complexity into New Zealand’s cooperation with the EU-
27 is the actual size of the supranational entity. A high number of the Union’s 
newcomers made it challenging for New Zealand to keep up with the EU’s activities 
in order to “remain a relevant and attractive partner”.112 Moreover, New Zealand’s 
closest partner and neighbour Australia – regardless of its confident stance as well 
as economic and political might – pays extra attention to some of the unique 
features of the EU. The Australian government makes it explicitly clear for the 
country’s business circles to treat the EU as a non-homogenous single market, 
advising to always take into account “[n]ational characteristics, histories, cultures, 
languages, demographics and incomes […] before doing business in the EU”.113 
 
A period of time when New Zealand politicians making official trips to Europe had 
to face back-at-home-prepared accusations of wasting time and money114 is in the 
past now. Also, it is likely to be treated as an ancient history, there were situations 
when Kiwis, according to some of the EU diplomats quoted by Gibbons, appeared 
“unable to mention the EU without immediately referring to (largely) historic 
disputes over butter quotas”.115 But while trying to take the most out of its 11 
governmental agencies based at the country’s 10 European embassies,116 it is still 
necessary for New Zealand to quickly make some additions to the country’s existing 
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geo-political vocabulary and to get accustomed to the range of new actors in the 
European arena. 
 
As an example, the fact of Slovenian presidency in the EU is already a history, but 
the small Alpine Central European state did not exist as an independent country less 
than 20 years ago. Therefore Slovenia was, like the Baltics, almost unknown in New 
Zealand that had been living and acting in a different system of political 
coordinates. As a result, back in 2003, those four European countries topped the 
table showing the least per cent of New Zealand residents who had personal links 
with.117 The situation hardly changed three years later when a similar survey was 
conducted by the more extended international team of researches – Estonia, Latvia 
and Slovenia were mentioned by the least number of New Zealand respondents as 
countries, with which they have personal or professional connections; Lithuania did 
not appear in the table at all.118  
 
At the same very time, providing a global perspective, the example of Slovenia, the 
wealthiest post-Communist country, was frequently mentioned by some of 
international observers in conjunction with Estonia. In October 2005, The 
Economist reported about some kind of informal friendly competition taking place 
between the two countries – Slovenian relative superiority was challenged by 
Estonia, the then fastest growing economy in Europe.119 The edition quoted Janez 
Jansa, the Slovenian Prime Minister, expressing epithets to Estonia’s flat tax rate, 
public administration and describing Estonia as a “good example” for his own 
country.120 According to the 2010 Transparency International Corruption Perception 
Index, Estonia and Slovenia are the two least corrupt post-Communist countries 
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(correspondingly holding 26th and 27th places in the list of 178 countries, leaving 
Spain, Portugal, Poland and Italy behind).121  
 
Such and similar nouvelle European trends have relevance to New Zealand. The 
country’s recognition of and timely reaction on the emergence of new European 
actors, especially in the constantly transforming EU of its latest version, are to help 
New Zealand in establishing a set of distinctive trajectories (a definite sign of 
functionalism) within the EU-related policies. Given the fact that New Zealand still 
has “relatively low tariff EU quota for cheese, butter, and beef and a large zero tariff 
quota for sheep meat”,122 one of the goals could be to have a better access to what 
was described by Goff as “home to people with the highest amount of purchasing 
power”.123 Another goal could be framed by a desire to not make the same mistake 
over and over again, failing to recognise a perspective partner’s functional capacity 
right in time. According to Winston Peters, a generation ago, New Zealanders saw 
the Republic of Ireland and Spain as “impoverished”.124 There is a big question 
whether New Zealand was among the first nations to foresee those two countries’ 
remarkable improvements or not. 
 
In July 2008, Peter Kennedy, the New Zealand Ambassador to the EU, acting on 
behalf of New Zealand signed the Agreement on Scientific and Technological 
Cooperation between the EU and New Zealand.125 Having entered into force in 
January 2009, this important document is helping to significantly increase 
international cooperation between researches from the two sides – for example, via 
the International Research Stuff Exchange Scheme that is designed to support the 
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EU-based institutions in their collaboration with colleagues elsewhere.126 According 
to the EU’s Lisbon Strategy adopted by the European Council in March 2000,127 the 
supranational entity’s goal “to make Europe the most dynamic and competitive, 
knowledge-based economy in the world”.128 In the light of this comprehensive 
policy and in spite of its evident implementation deficit, New Zealand will only be 
benefiting from collaboration with the EU.          
 
It is suggested that cooperation-related efforts “can be narrow or comprehensive in 
scope”.129 In case of the New Zealand – the Baltics interaction, the functional logic 
and lack of historical experience dictate smaller steps to be made first. For example, 
declared by Estonia in 1993, the unilateral abolishment of the visa requirement for 
the New Zealand citizens would be described as a small but extremely positive sign 
in the relationship building process. These types of function-driven tactical elements 
usually lead to “an array of possible outcomes, from […] sharing information to 
[…] pooling resources for join actions”.130 
 
Expressing his opinion on the subject, Mihkelson stated the following: 
I know that the student exchange process is pretty much there already for some 
years, but we need to think in a sophisticated way on what sort of programmes that 
institutions, organizations or universities could be offered for business people from 
both sides. Certainly, there is a big potential that is not used yet. 131 
 
Arguably, one of the best examples of steps forward is the establishment of the New 
Zealand Working Holiday Scheme (WHS) for the citizens of Estonia and Latvia (the 
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programme for Lithuanians is yet to be finalised). Having been commenced in 2007, 
the WHS runs identically for both Estonian and Latvian nationals: New Zealand is 
announcing 200 places available annually to young citizens of Estonia and Latvia 
(100 places for each country) for a stay of 12 months.132 Apart from meeting certain 
character requirements, the WHS participants must not bring children with them, 
have a minimum of NZ$ 4,200 available, be at least 18 and not more than 30 years 
old, and be coming to New Zealand to holiday (prime reason), with work being a 
secondary intention.133 Since its commencement, as confirmed by the Estonian 




2.2. The Baltic States and New Zealand – where are they at? 
 
Delivering her keynote address at an international conference in September 2008, 
Margaret Wilson, spoke about her country’s need “to be constantly aware of what is 
happening elsewhere”.135 Indeed, a South Pacific constitutional monarchy and a 
classic democracy, New Zealand has been gradually adjusting its foreign policy, 
drifting from traditional (and quite explainable) British-orientated vectors towards 
becoming more international.  
 
Clearly, the country’s current prime focus is “on bilateral and regional relations in 
the areas closest to [New Zealand]”,136 politically pointing to and economically 
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‘making it up with’ the Asia Pacific vast territory, which was largely ignored by 
New Zealand a half of a century before. At the same time, the European continent, 
one of the most lucrative markets for New Zealand goods, still has got a unique 
quality to attract New Zealand business circles and politicum. The EU countries 
have significant financial interest in New Zealand, too – the UK, for example, is “by 
far the largest single source of foreign portfolio investment in New Zealand”.137  
 
Talking to and dealing with Europe, and more specifically – to/with the EU, a small 
New Zealand is arguably succeeding in diminishing the ever-present “might is 
right”138 framework, primarily due to the country’s firm stance on global 
humanitarian issues, comprehensive climate change and free trade debates and 
nuclear-free image. In a number of cases, New Zealand’s classy performance in 
dealing with the EU – two-way trade is approximately NZ$ 12 billion a year139 – 
looks like a real feat as the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is far 
from being abolished yet. The CAP – it accounts to almost a half of the EU’s budget 
– is certainly limiting New Zealand’s access to the EU market. But having been 
battling against the tens of billions of euros of the EU’s subsidies to its farmers, is 
New Zealand realising its true potential and doing enough to promote itself in the 
enlarged EU, an entity that has changed so much in the last 10 years?   
 
According to Murray, New Zealand’s closest neighbour and the main trading 
partner Australia, despite holding about a half of its international reserves in 
euros,140 has “failed to take notice” that the EU “grew and evolved”.141 What about 
New Zealand?  
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Keeping in mind its prime focus on trade, let us have a glance on New Zealand’s 
trade figures with the Baltic States as well as a number of other European nations, 
so the status quo could be seen. Tables 3 and 4 represent New Zealand export and 
import merchandise trade with the Baltics for the period from their accession to the 
EU until now. The figures on trade with Georgia, Finland, Poland and Ukraine are 
shown for comparative reason.  
 
Table 3: New Zealand Total Export Merchandise Trade with the Baltic States, Finland, Georgia, 
Poland and Ukraine (FOB NZ$)142  
 
Commencing with the exporting side, one can note a highly sporadic nature of the 
process. In the period from 2008 to 2009, Poland alone took about as much of New 
Zealand goods as the Baltics all together. However, this fact does not necessarily 
mean that such a pattern is going to be repetitive in the future. The 2010 year to date 
export figures show that the three Baltics consumed more of New Zealand goods 
than Poland, with Lithuania being on the par with its big south-western neighbour. 
Arguably, the proper ‘homework’ on Poland (this country’s population is almost 12 
times more than of Lithuania’s) is yet to be done by New Zealand exporters.   
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Year/country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Estonia 1,926,482 2,416,249 3,009,840 2,185,126 3,295,227 1,257,080 
Latvia 3,785,459 2,393,049 4,130,003 4,019,069 5,403,012 2,208,227 
Lithuania 7,404,658 7,460,073 11,499,960 8,151,653 11,339,876 8,222,768 
Total Baltics 13,116,599 12,269,371 18,639,803 14,355,848 20,038,115 11,688,075 
Ukraine 1,683,840 3,330,029 7,692,205 13,523,246 22,875,014 10,074,943 
Georgia 16,800,044 4,381,914 11,910,458 13,668,300 25,428,870 12,249,945 
Finland 18,952,737 20,957,746 25,301,895 25,097,480 28,463,677 18,164,192 
Poland 15,269,885 15,484,734 13,983,104 19,092,507 20,848,029 11,249,806 
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In 2009, New Zealand wool accounted to 53 per cent of the country’s export to 
Lithuania, 39 per cent to Latvia and 32 per cent to Estonia. The other noticeable 
export commodities were ‘Fish and crustaceans’ and ‘Fruit and nuts’ for Lithuania 
(correspondingly, 17 per cent and 6 per cent of its New Zealand-related figures), 
‘Beverages and spirits’ for Latvia (45 per cent) and ‘Optical, photographic, 
cinematographic, measuring, checking, medical instruments’ for Estonia (18 per 
cent). In general, New Zealand export to the Baltics can be described as fairly small. 
But if it is compared to its export-related interactions with Finland, the Baltic States’ 
immediate neighbour with population smaller than of the trio’s total, throughout the 
last decade, New Zealand potential in the Baltics is far from being fully realised. 
One can argue that an Estonian would rather buy dairy produce from a local farmer 
rather than spending kroons on Kiwi butter, but this particular item is not the only 
product New Zealand could offer to the Baltics to make its ‘trading presence’ in the 
region more substantial. Wine, farming machinery and equipment, sheep breeding 
technologies, wool, king salmon and lamb – all these New Zealand trade-mark 
products, with the right marketing strategy, could find reliable clients in Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania.    
 
Table 4: New Zealand Total Import Merchandise Trade with the Baltic States, Finland, Georgia, 
Poland and Ukraine (CIF NZ$)143  
Year/country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Estonia 632,401 1,195,050 2,713,031 653,006 1,821,630 3,285,404 
Latvia 855,898 1,328,623 1,140,463 896,031 1,814,882 1,802,924 
Lithuania 366,618 212,797 696,495 815,999 52,861,635 1,927,331 
Total Baltics 1,854,917 2,736,470 4,549,989 2,365,036 56,498,147 7,015,659 
Ukraine 4,180,967 6,804,901 6,170,623 4,420,211 13,664,694 4,586,569 
Georgia 94,181 163,342 464,343 38,291 677,173 142,273 
Finland 204,912,429 183,649,290 163,562,0015 147,113,489 177,395,749 167,623,837 
Poland 23,901,440 35,938,485 24,415,618 30,612,083 40,414,463 43,040,529 
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Evidently, the New Zealand import from the Baltics is currently even more sporadic 
than the export. For example, having imported goods from the Baltic States for less 
than NZ$ 3 million in 2007, New Zealand suddenly purchased mineral fuel from 
Lithuania for NZ$ 50 million a year later. In 2009, everything returned to a modest 
scale of things, even though the import from the Baltics tripled as compared to the 
2007 indicators. As for imported commodities in 2009, the only sizable input 
arrived from Estonia with ‘Electrical machinery and equipment’ – it was attributed 
to 80 per cent of the Baltic country’s goods sent to New Zealand (NZ$ 2,655,000) 
and 37 per cent of the total import from the Baltic States. At present, the trade 
between New Zealand and the Baltics represents a positive saldo for the former, and 
it is likely to grow in New Zealand favour. On this background, the trading 
disbalance that New Zealand is experiencing with Finland deserves attention. Not 
only the technologically advanced Finnish state sent ‘Paper and paperboard’ (NZ$ 
30 million), ‘Boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances’ (NZ$ 33 million) and 
‘Electrical machinery and equipment’ (NZ$ 30 million) to the South Pacific nation 
in 2009. New Zealand also spent NZ$ 27.5 million to purchase ‘Meat and edible 
meat offal’ from Finland, too (it accounted to 16 per cent of its import from Finland 
and was more than New Zealand total import to that country).  
 
Overall, this kind of dynamics, regardless of its certain degree of chaos, could be 
better analysed closer to the end of the global economic recession as the export-
import indicators have already picked up in the second half of 2010. It is suggested 
that for New Zealand, enhancing cooperation with the enlarged EU, is necessary to 
have “a wider relationship, one in which each partner can see benefit from 
contributing towards”.144 For the Baltics, the need in finding reliable partners has 
always been vital as well. Getting back to the 1991-1992 period, Priit Pallum 
remembered his newly independent country’s “conscious decision”145 to quickly get 
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into trading activity with the wider world. Moreover, a better level of New Zealand 
representation in the region (with the help of two embassies established in Warsaw 
and Stockholm) is firmly framing one of the newest strategic vectors in New 
Zealand foreign policy – it is directly pointing to the broader Baltic region that 
includes Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This approach should generate more 
knowledge about the Baltic States’ potential – during the Soviet-times, New 
Zealand representatives in the area were rare guests in the Baltics for several 
reasons. Some of New Zealand Ambassadors to the Soviet Union never visited the 
Baltic trio at all.         
 
2.3. Operational capacity of cooperation 
 
Interestingly enough, the EU’s operational ‘set-back’, caused by the Irish rejection 
of the Lisbon Treaty in June 2008, echoed in New Zealand in the most unexpected 
way. The country’s major business edition, The National Business Review, 
ironically suggested that New Zealand should “push its case” 146  to join the EU, if 
“the Irish are serious in wanting out”.147 Elaborating a bit further and possibly 
entering the sphere of political ‘science fiction’, given that New Zealand could have 
easily fulfilled necessary requirements to become an EU Member, the geographical 
isolation should not have been treated as a major obstacle.       
 
On a serious note, aiming to collect both elite representatives’ and students’ views 
on the necessity for New Zealand to promote its image, business interests, scientific 
achievements and political values in the Baltic States, a small survey was conducted 
in the period from 2007 to 2009. Some of the main findings are as follows: 
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Question 1 – Appendix 1 (for New Zealand respondents):   
Is it necessary for New Zealand to promote its image, business interests, scientific 
achievements and political values in the Baltic States, one of the newest parts of the 
European Union?  
1. 79 per cent of respondents (17 people) answered positively.  
2. Overwhelming majority of respondents (95 per cent or 18 individuals) decided to 
elaborate on the issue rather than giving a simplistic ‘yes/no’ answer. 
3. 100 per cent of elite representatives (8 in total) responded positively. 
4. From 11 students who agreed to take part in the survey, 2 (18 per cent) answered 
negatively to the question; one of the two answers was given in the form of “not 
really”. 
 
A number of patterns were found in the answers. The ‘small country’ theme was 
mentioned by three elite representatives and four students (37 per cent of all 
respondents). In three of the seven answers, New Zealand and the Baltic States were 
mentioned together in the context of their sizes – “New Zealand and the Baltic 
countries are all small” (elite), “New Zealand as a country that is of a similar size [to 
the Baltics]” (elite), and “[…] important for New Zealand to maintain contact with 
other small countries” (student). The remaining four respondents opted to be one-
sided in describing the entities’ sizes – “New Zealand seems to be a too small 
country to those Baltic States” (student), “[New Zealand] as a small state that has 
the potential to be isolated from global issues and interests” (student), “The Baltics 
States are too small to be important to New Zealand” (student), and “[W]ith around 
7 million inhabitants the Baltics comprise a very small market” (elite).   
 
Another pattern could be named as ‘similar values’. Four respondents (21 per cent) 
acknowledged a high level of similarity between New Zealand and the Baltics in 
terms of fundamental values. For example, “New Zealand and the EU have 
traditionally been aligned on global political issues” (student), “Baltic States […] as 
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three voices in the EU with many similar interests and policies to New Zealand” 
(elite), “New Zealand and the Baltics States share a number of fundamental values” 
(elite), and “[…] similarity of perspectives and values, based on importance of 
democracy and the rule of law” and “[…] working as likeminded countries on the 
international stage” (elite).    
 
The economic factors in cooperation with the Baltics are of prime importance for 
Kiwis. Ten respondents (53 per cent), including six students and four elite 
representatives, prioritised economic/business indicators in their answers. A 
statement about New Zealand as an “open economy” (student) is reinforced by a 
note that the “image of New Zealand goes hand in hand with the marketability of 
New Zealand business” (student). In addition, the Baltics are seen as “more 
important partners as their economies have opened” (student). Emphasising the 
general importance of trade with the EU, a respondent specified that “obviously 
trade with new [Member] States will be important, too” (student). A student argued 
that “New Zealand has a very strong need to promote itself as a business and 
tourism location in parts of the world such as the Baltic States”. A note about “great 
potential benefit” (student) was indirectly reframed by several forward-looking 
statements regarding the ways to “work together to our mutual advantages” (elite) 
and New Zealand’s permanent desire to “be looking to develop new markets” 
(elite). The same interviewee also commented that New Zealand should not forget 
about “the bottom-line value” as the key indicator of economic efficiency. Some of 
respondents were very specific, putting accent on the Baltic States’ interest “in New 
Zealand farming practice and how it can be applied in their own countries” (elite) or 
making emphasis that the Baltics “have their own characteristics both culturally but 
especially economically” with Estonia and Latvia being “more economically 
advanced than Lithuania” (elite). 
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Being indicated by four respondents (21 per cent), the last pattern has a dichotomist 
nature and is arguably based on (or can be explained by) the ambiguous format of 
the contemporary EU. Should New Zealand forget about the fact that the EU’s 
Member States are still de jure sovereign countries and start concentrating on 
dealing with the EU’s supranational institutions only? Or should decision makers 
from New Zealand establish connections directly with the Member States as well? 
Indeed, the political environment where the EU’s Member States are still dominant 
but not the only actors148 seems highly innovative for New Zealand. In order to 
maintain the country’s wider interest in the EU, a respondent underscored the 
importance for New Zealand to “be able to engage separately with each country [of 
the EU]” (elite). In the line with the latter statement, a student stressed on the fact 
that “[p]eople think that Europe is just ‘the big three’ [Germany, the UK and 
France] and do not realise the untapped potential existing in the rest of Europe”. 
Another lot of opinions were based on the necessity to deal with the Baltics 
“predominantly in the context of the EU rather than for bilateral linkages” (elite) 
and that the Baltic States “are also new Member States of the EU and the EU is very 
important to New Zealand” (elite).       
 
Summary of Patterns 
The ‘small country’ theme 
Similarity of fundamental values that the Baltics and New Zealand share 
Economic factors are of prime importance 
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Question 2 – Appendix 2 (for the Baltics):   
Would you think that New Zealand has chances to be welcomed by both elites and 
the public in the Baltic region (particularly in Estonia or Latvia or Lithuania) as a 
potential high-scale partner of the Baltic States? 
 
1. 75 per cent of respondents (27 individuals) gave positive answers to this question. 
2. 83 per cent (or 30 people) decided to explain why they had given a particular 
answer.  
3. 100 per cent of respondents from Estonia (16 participants) who answered the 
question positively were accompanied by 50 per cent of the Latvian total (3) and 71 
per cent of Lithuanians (10).    
4. The question was misunderstood by 3 participants (one student from Latvia and 
the other two were Lithuanian students); no signs of misunderstanding shown by the 
Estonian part of the group that was the largest of the three. 
 
Before commencing with a number of patterns found in the answers, it would be 
worthwhile mentioning that the supposedly predictable lack of knowledge about 
New Zealand among the respondents from the Baltic States did not appear to be the 
case in this sample. On the contrary, many respondents (nine individuals or 25 per 
cent) were willing to give their thought or vision on the issues directly related to 
New Zealand international profile and the country’s identity or how they perceive 
it. A view that “[t]here is no public opinion about New Zealand at all” (student, 
Latvia), was not supported by the others. For example, New Zealand was described 
as “a cradle of social democracy” (student, Estonia) as well as “one of the oldest 
democracies in the world […], a typically developed Western country” (student, 
Estonia).  A respondent from the elite group noted that New Zealand’s “experiences 
were important for Estonia in transition process”. A similar comment had a future-
pointing vector stating that the “ordinary Lithuanians do not view New Zealand just 
as a far-away country, but rather a very attractive and successful country, which 
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could teach us a lot” (elite). The next individual underscored that “New Zealand is 
[a] more developed country than Lithuania” (student). There was also a statement 
that “New Zealand is perhaps perceived more ‘European’ by Estonians than many 
[of] European countries, especially in Southern Europe” (student). In addition, for 
the other respondent, the image of the distant South Pacific country was associated 
with the taste of New Zealand lamb stake – “[i]t tastes more than delicious” – and a 
possibility to order it at a Tallinn restaurant (student, Estonia). At the same time, the 
knowledge about New Zealand and its European as well as Asia-Pacific roots 
sometimes led a respondent towards asking a problematic question on the “kind of 
identity New Zealand sees in the future [for itself]” (elite, Latvia). The latter view 
was partially supported by a commenter who argued that “New Zealand depends [on 
the] other region” (student, Latvia), with a possible meaning that the country 
became too attached to the area of its location to look for new partners elsewhere.    
 
The next pattern – the similarity of values – was distinctly framed by six 
respondents. New Zealand was seen as “a like-minded country” to Lithuania (elite). 
It was also argued that the Latvian state does “not have any kind of bilateral 
problems with New Zealand” (elite). The response from the Estonian side was very 
much in the same line – “we do not have big differences, there are quite a lot of 
values that we share” (elite) and “New Zealand and Estonia share the same values 
and beliefs on various matters” (elite). Moreover, there was a statement claiming 
that both New Zealand and Estonia “have appropriate conditions for doing business, 
such as effective market economy that ensures stable and reliable business climate 
[…] where corruption practically does not exist” (elite). Lastly for this pattern, a 
respondent noted that “mentally and psychologically […] it is a very logical way to 
have more contacts” with New Zealand (elite, Estonia).   
 
In continuation of the similarity pattern, there were three comments on the sizes of 
New Zealand and the Baltics. One respondent noted “a similarity of physical size 
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and population between New Zealand and the Baltics States” (elite, Latvia). The 
other one wrote about the “comparative size of our countries” (elite, Estonia). There 
was also a statement made by an Estonian student that “certain views about life and 
attitudes should coincide with two of our countries both on macro and micro level”.  
 
The issue of the distance between New Zealand and the Baltic States was brought 
up by seven respondents (19 per cent). In all of those comments, the ‘far away’ 
theme was described as a stumbling block on the way to a more enhanced 
cooperation. However, in most of the cases, the general connotation of distance was 
not entirely based on the pessimistic view – the survey participants simply decided 
to mention the undeniable fact.  For example, a respondent claimed that to the 
Latvian people “New Zealand is far and exotic country” (student). A Lithuanian 
elite representative noted that “the economical and political communication […] is 
skidding” because of “a big distance” between the two regions. The next commenter 
expressed his concern that “[i]t would be difficult to participate in projects because 
New Zealand is so far” (student, Lithuania). The question of “rational considering 
the distances” was underlined by an Estonian student with another one stating that 
New Zealand is “rather far away”. A respondent from the elite group, after 
describing the physical distance between New Zealand and the Baltics as “a 
handicap”, immediately noted that “the ease and proliferation of modern 
communication” could help in overcoming such a problem (Latvia). A similar 
commentary was received from an Estonian respondent who argued that “the 
distance is a problem, but in nowadays it is not that substantial any more” (elite).  
 
The answers collected under this particular segment of the survey outlined the 
openness and the liberalist nature of the Baltics. Nine respondents (25 per cent) 
opted to elaborate on the subject, giving short introductions of their countries and 
characterising the Baltic States as open and liberal. A participant from the elite 
group noted that Estonians “have no presumptions and are open to any interesting 
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idea”. From the Lithuanian side, a student indicated that his country and the other 
Baltics “are searching for international partners in wide range of different areas”. 
The other two respondents argued that “[Estonia’s] trade policy in general has been 
very open to the rest of the world” (elite) and “we are looking long way for 
establishing good relations with new partners” (elite, Estonia). The latter statements 
were in agreement with the following opinions, which came from the studentship: 
“Estonian economic scene is very open” and “[w]e are definitely open to all new 
interesting contacts in the field of politics as well as in economic affairs” (Estonia). 
The answer collected from the Latvian sub-group was featured by comments on 
Latvia’s “economic liberalism position” and the importance “to trade […] to have 
more different goods in the market” (student). The Latvian state was also described 
as “a good place to start business not just in the Baltics but in the broader territory” 
(elite). Lastly for this segment, an Estonian elite representative placed his answer 
directly in the context of the New Zealand-Estonia relations noting that 
“preparations are under way for deepening our contacts”.  
 
Summary of Patterns 
New Zealand is known in the Baltics 
Similarity of fundamental values that the Baltics and New Zealand share 
Comparable sizes of the Baltic States and New Zealand 
The ‘distance’ theme 
The Baltics States are open and liberal countries 
 
2.4. Mini-conclusion  
 
Evidently, the discussion on the need for New Zealand to make a proper 
introduction of itself in the Baltics is becoming more rhetorical with the time. As a 
potential partner, New Zealand is likely to have a fair chance to be welcomed by the 
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local elites and the public in the region that covers Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. As 
argued, the theoretical angle of the process could be successfully framed by the 
revival of the classic functionalist tendencies – the global economic downturn made 
it easier for the like-minded countries of comparable sizes to better visualise each 
other’s capabilities. Indeed, in the challenging time of the economic recession, the 
search for common needs is presumably better executed by the partners with 
common values, be it on the global or local stages. At the same time, the structural 
side of the paradigm is featuring a noticeable degree of sporadic (sometimes even 
chaotic) activity. The already established and internationally recognised frameworks 
that should have supposedly led to a significant increase in trading activity between 
New Zealand and the Baltics are yet to be realised in full – partially, due to the 
recessional economic factors, distance and the ambiguity of the EU’s political form 
(where to go? who to talk to?). However, with one of the Baltics being already a 
member of the OECD group, the profile of the liberal and transparent Baltic trio is 
likely to appear as more visible and pronounced among the politicum as well as the 
business circles in New Zealand. Advantageously, according to the aforementioned 
results of the small survey, New Zealand is already not a terra incognita for the 










3. A New Zealand ‘hub’ in the Baltics: A Prospect to 
Make a Choice 
 
The aforementioned opening of the New Zealand Embassy in the Polish capital in 
April 2005 was a logical response to the government’s already sounded desire “to 
get to know colleagues in Central Europe a lot better”.149 Following the combined 
objective logic of regional proximity, cost effectiveness and geo-political indicators, 
the decision was made to get Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania included in the 
diplomatic region covered by the Embassy in Warsaw. Such a move had presumably 
some subjective reasons as well. In August 1999, Simon Upton, New Zealand 
Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, visited Estonia.150 A number of 
important visits to the Baltics made by high-level New Zealand officials in 2004 
evidently helped to receive positive impressions of the Baltic trio, too. Pallum 
highly credited David Bruce Payton, New Zealand former Ambassador to the 
Baltics (2002-2005), for playing a leading role in organising those visits. According 
to Pallum, Ambassador Payton, while being based in The Hague, “managed to visit 
Estonia several times […] and convinced his country’s politicians to come […to 
Estonia] and see themselves how this country looks like”.151 In September 2004, 
Phil Goff became New Zealand’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade to visit 
the three Baltic States.152      
 
Can the Embassy in Warsaw, apart from looking after Poland-New Zealand matters, 
be used as the established and the potentially productive ‘gateway’ to the Baltic 
States as well? Some of the influential representatives of the New Zealand politicum 
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– for example, the current Minister of Defence Wayne Mapp – strongly argue that 
Poland is already New Zealand’s ‘gateway’ to the region and the Baltics “can be 
serviced through on Embassy in Poland”.153 A view from the Baltic side is different, 
stressing on the argument that the other nations’ embassies, which cover, for 
example, Estonia but operate either from Poland or Finland, usually focus on the 
country of the embassy’s location.154                     
 
The Embassy in Warsaw has got accustomed to its vital role of being New 
Zealand’s only high-level diplomatic representation in the Baltics-Poland broad 
region. Back in October 2005, New Zealand Ambassador Philip Griffiths 
underscored that one of his country’s priorities is to maintain “an open dialogue 
with the EU and its Member States”.155 The October 2007 appointment of the 
country’s new Ambassador in Warsaw, Dr. Penelope Ridings, was a clear gesture in 
a direction to reinforce New Zealand’s activities in the area. Commenting on Dr. 
Ridings’ appointment, Minister Peters described Poland as “an important contact 
[…] on European Union matters”.156 He also characterised Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania as “small, forward-thinking countries with important connections in 
Europe”.157   
 
However, it is suggested that in the nearest future, the Polish state in itself – its 
landmass is larger than of Italy’s and more than ten times larger than of Belgium’s – 
will be predominantly capturing the Embassy’s attention and currently available 
small resources. As a result, it can significantly diminish New Zealand’s ‘presence’ 
in the Baltic States.   
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In New Zealand and Australian media, Poland “featured frequently in the economic 
news … [and] was also regarded as the political ‘face’ of the [EU’s] fifth 
enlargement”.158 Poland is an attractive place to invest – from January to November 
2009, the value of FDI to the country was recorded as EURO 7.66 billion.159 Poland, 
the European leader in outsourcing,160 has also been enjoying an important strategic 
status in the continental and global security framework; its burgeoning relationship 
with New Zealand as well as its key status in the EU’s decision making process – all 
these factors have already proven that New Zealand made a right choice locating the 
country’s first Central-Eastern European Embassy in Warsaw. Moreover, this 
research work has no intention to undermine or question this existing status of the 
diplomatic representation in the Polish capital. The crucial point to be made here is 
that the promising momentum to enhance relationships with Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania (either together or separately) could quickly lose its pace if New Zealand 
is to be preoccupied with Poland-related issues. As discussed previously, New 
Zealand Statistics data for 2008-2009 showed that the country’s export to Poland 
was on the par with the figures related to the Baltic States summerised all 
together.161  
 
In order to avoid a real possibility for New Zealand to eventually lose the Baltic 
States from the radar of the country’s proactive foreign policy in the EU-27, this 
paper intends to initiate a debate on the need for the country to establish its ‘hub’ in 
the Baltics. Ideally, according to John Larkindale (the former New Zealand 
Ambassador in the Baltics – 1996-2000, based in Moscow – expressed his personal 
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opinion), New Zealand’s wider interests in the EU could become a driving force 
towards engaging “separately with each country”162 of the enlarged EU.  
 
The country-to-country type of interactions is normally clearer or even stronger than 
the country-to-union of countries type (the best example of the former is the USA-
Poland or the USA-Britain relationship as compared to relationship between the 
USA and the EU). In reality, however, it is a fairly challenging and costly exercise 
to be implemented, especially when it comes to establishing an ‘on the ground’ 
representation.  
 
Most definitely, the New Zealand’s ‘on the ground’ embassy-type base in the 
Baltics is outside of the circle of possibilities at present. Thus the concept of a ‘hub’ 
– either formal or informal – should productively work as an alternative that could 
eventuate with bringing some substance into the popular rhetoric about cooperation 
and partnership in a strategically important region. In 2007, Siim Raie, the then 
Director General of the Estonian Chamber of Commerce, expressed his vision of the 
process: 
[B]y the way the New Zealand Honorary Consul in Estonia is the President of our 
Chamber of Commerce; and it can be advantageous in several cases. […]  There is 
no reason just to have an office that everybody can walk in and say ‘Hello!’ What 
the office should then have and do is that it should have some programmes for 
students, scientists, whoever. This is the way other countries are acting here.163  
 
The acknowledgement of one of the Baltic States as a ‘gateway’ to their area could 
with necessity simplify the task of coordination of New Zealand’s activities in the 
region via its Embassy in Warsaw. Does this idea have a long-lasting perspective at 
all? The modern waves of the ever-present regionalism on the European continent 
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are suggested to frame this chapter’s theoretical concept, which should assist New 
Zealand readers to get a better understanding of the Baltics’ role in the new Europe.                  
 
3.1. Theoretical dimension: Regionalism in Europe       
 
As it was noted in the Preamble (p. 7), the modern New Zealand state, before it gets 
more familiar with the newer actors in Europe, should find it easier to start 
collaborating with the EU neophytes in the framework of interaction with their 
regions. Moreover, the EU, arguably accepting and supporting “its internal 
regionalisation”,164 would indirectly praise New Zealand for its intention to establish 
its own linkages in a less-known region of the supranational Union. Having 
legitimised the importance of the distinct “regional layer in the […] complicated 
arrangement of [its] governance”,165 the EU established a number of regional 
programmes like Northern Dimension Programme that, in this case, “is focusing 
attention upon the uniqueness of Europe’s north-eastern region as a whole”.166 In a 
more simplistic way of saying, the official Brussels has not got much time to ‘show 
New Zealand around’, thus one of New Zealand’s most distinct qualities – its very 
own interaction-building creativity – is required and will presumably be appreciated 
by the EU.      
 
Indeed, it is not difficult for a New Zealand decision maker to identify a regional 
grouping in the Central-Eastern Europe if one wants to. Some of a group’s 
‘members’ or their historical predecessors used to be known for long time as the one 
(Slovakia and the Czech Republic as Czechoslovakia; Austria and Hungary as 
Austro-Hungarian empire; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, 
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Montenegro, Serbia and the newly established Kosovo as Yugoslavia; Poland and 
Lithuania as Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth). The others share plenty of 
common history as neighbours (Albania and Macedonia, or Bulgaria and Romania, 
or Poland, Ukraine and Belarus).  
 
3.1.1. The Baltic bit in the Europe of regions        
 
As for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, this group arguably represents a mixture of, 
firstly, a neighbourhood of uniquely different countries, and, secondly, the 
geopolitical one. The former perception is less pronounced even to date. It is 
usually voiced and reinforced by the leaders of the trio that “the three sister nations 
on the east cost of the Baltic Sea […] have their own special needs and special 
interests”.167 The latter perception is more sounding and goes way back to the post-
World War I period when, for example, the British Foreign Office saw the then 
newly independent Baltic States as a whole, despite some obvious socio-political 
differences between them.168 This view was however a huge step ahead in 
distinguishing the Baltics from the other lot of different ‘want-to-be’ independent 
states established on the territory of the former Russian tsarist empire before or 
shortly after the end of the World War I (the ill-fated Ukrainian People’s Republic 
was one of such polities).   
 
Another angle of the broad Western view on the independent Baltics, according to 
Ben Fowkes, was based on the conclusion that Estonia along with the other two 
Baltic States as well as Georgia and Armenia were the only nationhoods that could 
be treated as “sufficiently developed” before they were incorporated into the former 
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USSR.169 Predictably, the official Soviet vision of the situation was diametrically 
different – the post-World War I independent Baltic States were seen by the Soviet 
Union as “nominally independent, but […] under the political and economic 
influence of Britain from 1919”.170   
 
Taking into account New Zealand’s cautious attitude in recognising new countries 
(a definite legacy of the British approach in foreign affairs), official Wellington, for 
example, formally recognised Estonia for the first time three years after it became 
independent, on 22 September 1921. By that moment in history, Estonia as well as 
Latvia and Lithuania were already members of the League of Nations.171 
 
The forceful incorporation of the Baltic States in the Soviet communist empire and 
the following Soviet period in the history of the Baltics did not make each of the 
three countries more distinguishable even within the USSR, not to mention the rest 
of the world. The refusal to recognise the Soviet annexation of the Baltics (New 
Zealand took that approach, too) was however the West’s weak and only answer to 
Josef Stalin – the Soviet dictator was fully aware that he “could proceed to dispose 
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania however he liked”.172    
 
The then Baltic titular republics of the Soviet Union were informally called by a 
Russian word ‘Pribaltika’, a commonly known terminological label that was quasi-
unifying Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into one, on the basis of their geographical 
proximity to the Baltic Sea. For an outsider, despite each of the three republics’ 
easily found originalities, it was to some extent hard to allocate a typically 
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‘Estonian’ or ‘Latvian’ or ‘Lithuanian’ piece in the uniformed geo-social 
environment of the vast USSR. For example, a randomly chosen book (located at 
the Central Library of the University of Canterbury) that was supposed to introduce 
an international reader (in our case, a New Zealand scholar or university student) to 
Latvia’s contemporary art had only 8 out of total 84 reproductions, which may not 
be considered as Soviet-style propaganda.173 At the same time, in the book, there 
were 7 reproductions directly related to Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin);174 such ‘art 
works’ were ideologically reflecting to the title of the book: ‘The Soviet Latvia in 
the Brotherly Family’.  
 
Characteristically for Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, regardless of their places 
of residence in the former USSR, they showed significant resilience towards 
Russification. For example, in the 1989 census, 95.5 per cent of ethnic Estonians in 
the Soviet Union and 98.9 per cent of those residing in the Estonian Soviet Socialist 
Republic considered Estonian as their first language.175                    
 
Even though the three Baltic republics had been experiencing a relative ‘linguistic 
liberalism’ if only compared to the Kremlin’s ruthless attitude towards Belarusian 
and Ukrainian languages, the obvious ‘European’ flavour of the Soviet Baltics was 
not promoted internationally by the Soviet Union. Only in 1964, the Finnish 
president Urho Kaleva Kekkonen, a politician who managed to be treated with equal 
respect by both democratic world and the USSR, was the first head of a Western 
state to be allowed by the Soviet regime to visit the Baltics (he visited the Estonian 
capital Tallinn).176  
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As for New Zealand, in 1960, Walter Nash was the country’s first Prime Minister to 
visit the USSR; however his trip to the Soviet Union included visits to the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine only.177 In this context, the memoirs of Jim Weir who was 
allowed to briefly visit Estonia in April 1979 could be treated as unique. While in 
Tallinn, the Ambassador noted “a labyrinth of narrow, cobbled streets, […] the old 
city, built on a hill, overlooking the new; and […] the spires of the churches, the 
Gothic style, the Europeanness of it all”.178 Crossing the boundary between Estonia 
and the Russian Federation, Ambassador Weir recalled a much stronger impression:  
When we came to the Narva River, […] it marked the boundary between the 
Estonian and the Russian Republics. There was scarcely any need to tell us, so 
marked was the change to unkempt, dispirited-looking villages […] – a remarkable 
contrast considering that Estonia has been under Russian rule since 1710, with a 
break from only 1918 to 1940.179 
 
A feature of the time, a range of typical Soviet-style complications (bans, 
authorisations, proposed journey approvals, the open-closed cities policies) 
prevented Ambassador Weir from visiting Riga and Vilnius by car, as “no 
foreigners [were] allowed on the road between Tallinn and Leningrad”.180 Thus both 
Latvian and Lithuanian capitals had to be excluded from the Ambassador’s list of 
places to visit at that particular time. 
 
The above brief overview shows that New Zealand’s interest towards the Baltics, 
from the period of their recognition and placing Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into 
geo-political clusters of Europe and right until the trio’s last decade spent under the 
Soviet umbrella, was not very consistent, neither New Zealand’s nor the Baltics’ 
lapse – and can be described as patchy. Intuitively, New Zealand was always on its 
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way to identify the significant potential of cooperation with the Baltics, but a 
number of intractable hurdles, be it ideological, politico-economical and 
geographical, delayed the process and prevented the two sides from making any 
harmonious steps towards each other.  
 
3.1.2. Aspirations to lead the region        
 
Both the fall of the Iron Curtain and the appearance of the EU have immensely 
helped countries like New Zealand to gradually learn about the new Europe and 
make attempts to effectively establish more European vectors. The regionalised 
nature of the EU have been playing an advantageous role in this process – by 
making a contact with one perspective partner among the newer Members of the 
EU, New Zealand has been getting a chance to discover a much broader region as 
well. Furthermore, the somewhat cumbersome process that however successfully 
eventuated with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by the EU’s all Member States, 
was an additional proof that the European regionalism is very much alive and will 
be formatting “local demand on global trends”.181  
 
From the other side, as argued by Vernygora and Chaban, the EU’s neophytes have 
demonstrated aspirations to lead their sub-regions182 and assist potential partners 
with information and practical help. For example, Bērziņš noted his Latvia’s 
willingness “to provide [New Zealand decision makers] with all kind of 
expertise”183 about developments taking place in his country’s broader region. Such 
an offer is highly advantageous for New Zealand, especially in the light of its 
declared “intention to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement with Russia”.184 But in case 
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of Latvia and the other two of the Baltics, the broader region means not only the 
Russian Federation, the trio’s immediate as well as strategically important 
neighbour. Azerbaijan (the oil- and gas-rich Caspian nation), Belarus (the largest 
inland country in Europe), Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Ukraine are in the 
broader region’, too. Almost all of these countries are still viewed by New Zealand 
through its Embassy in Russia, for some reason keeping the Soviet legacy of ‘all 
roads lead to Moscow’ alive. Bērziņš pointed on the fact that an entity like his 
Latvia “understand[s] these countries much better because before [Latvia, Lithuania 
and Estonia] were to escape the Soviet Union and join the European Union, [they] 
were all together”.185 During the challenging time of the global economic crises, 
such propositions formulated by the Baltic States with intentions to be heard could 
increase New Zealand chances to yield the result of its Baltic endevours.  
 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are no strangers among the lot of smaller countries, 
which feel the need to re-introduce themselves to the larger partners from time to 
time. Having been trying to adopt the role of a “pacifying and stabilising element”186 
in the Central-Eastern Europe, the Baltics have however experienced the whole 
palette of different approaches applied onto them by the world’s powers. On the 
one side, some of the more powerful countries had been condescendingly regarding 
the Baltics as a variation of the “cordon sanitaire to the flung around Soviet 
Russia”187 (Great Britain), treating the trio as “an easier target”188 in the sphere of 
it’s immediate geo-political interests (Russia) or even envisaging the three countries 
as a single territory within a totalitarian state189 (the Nazi Germany). On the other 
side and contrary to the latter views, some of the world’s powers have always been 
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attracted by “the Baltic markets and products”,190 heavily investing into local 
financial institutions and businesses. For example, in 1920s, a sizable Estonian bank 
(the Tartu Bank) became a brunch of British Overseas Bank191. Another example 
comes from Latvia, where foreign capital used to form 50 per cent of the country’s 
stock capital in 1925, beating this record year later with 52.7 per cent.192 The same 
very period of 1920s was marked in the Baltics by “the modernization of agriculture 
[…] as well as specialization in high quality dairy and meat products”.193 This kind 
of development led to the Baltic States becoming capable to corner “a share of these 
markets in the face of competition from established suppliers, such as Denmark, 
Canada and New Zealand”.194        
 
During the non-transparent time of the Soviet domination over the Baltics and 
remembering about the pre-World War II independent Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania, some of the Western powers naïvely suggested that the Soviet Union 
could “accord the Baltic republics the same kind of status as that enjoyed by the 
three Benelux countries”.195 This never happened.  
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 changed the situation in the most dramatic 
way, and the 2004 enlargement of the EU brought the Baltics back to Europe. In 
May 2006, the Baltic States made headlines in New Zealand media and around the 
world when Lithuania (jointly with Poland) hosted the intergovernmental 
conference ‘Common Vision for Common Neighbourhood’ that became known as 
the 2006 Vilnius Conference. Stressing on the need to welcome “the initiatives to 
expand cooperation across Europe [and] promoting European and transatlantic 
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integration”,196 the forum also heard the US Vice-President Richard Cheney calling 
the Baltic region as “the very front lines of freedom in the modern world”.197 
Reporting about the forum, The New Zealand Herald quoted Cheney’s statement 
specifically directed to Russia that it has “nothing to fear and everything to gain 
from strong stable democracies on its borders”.198  
 
A year later, in October 2007, the same hosts managed to organise another 
international forum – the ‘Vilnius Energy Security Conference’ – that was dedicated 
to the red hot topic of formulating “the global and European energy landscape”.199 
Once again, the advantageous strategic location of the Baltic States associated with 
their clear position on the issues of global importance brought plenty of world’s 
attention to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  
 
Arguably, the issue of knowledge that the Baltics possess in relations to their 
broader region is not to be treated in the theoretical framework only. The Baltic 
States’ active participation in such organisations as the Baltic Assembly (BA), the 
Nordic Council and the Community of Democratic Choice (CDC) brings a solid 
practical dimension into the process and opportunities to permanently get the up-to-
dated information on regional matters. The latter two regional organisations are 
different in size, levels of operational capacity and regulatory environment, but the 
Baltics’ involvement in both establishments significantly diversifies their foreign 
policy directions and strengthens their profiles internationally. For example, the BA, 
a parliamentary organisation established in November 1991 in the Estonian capital, 
is a consultative body that uses “trilateral cooperation as a force multiplier in 
                                                 
196
 ‘Joint Communiqué’, accepted on 4 May 2006, Vilnius, in The Vilnius Conference’06 Official web page 
<http://www.vilniusconference2006.lt/sen/news.full/54?prn=1>. Also see Vernygora and Chaban, ‘New 
Europe and its neo-regionalism’.  
197
 Richard Cheney, ‘Remarks at the 2006 Vilnius Conference’, 4 May 2006.  
198
 ‘Cheney rebukes Russia on democracy’ in The New Zealand Herald, 5 May 2006. Available from 
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/print.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10380368&pnum=0>.     
199
 Vilnius Energy Security Conference 2007. Available from <http://www.vilniusconference2007.lt/en/apie>. 
 63 
international affairs”.200 It played an important role for the Baltic States in the 
challenging process of joining the EU and NATO. From the regional point of view, 
the organisation was heavily involved in designing and developing the area of 
common “economic, educational and informational technology space”201 among the 
Baltics. The other aforementioned international regional body, the CDC, brings 
together only nine members as different as Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR 
Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia and Ukraine, but it covers the massive 
area populated by around 89 million people.202 Planned to be a forum for young and 
ambitious Central-Eastern European democracies, this organisation (established in 
December 2005 in Kyiv) is suggested to play an instrumental role in “gathering the 
Baltic-Black-Caspian Seas countries under one economic umbrella”.203 The Baltic 
States’ participation in the CDC is far from being declarative. For example, Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia are Estonia’s main development cooperation partners, to 
which the Baltic country has been devoting millions of kroons/euros in development 
aid annually.204  With Estonia’s active support of the further enlargement of the EU, 
the country’s initiative of establishing in Tallinn an Eastern Partnership training 
centre205 could be considered as a step made by a regional leader with a vision on 
enhancing the process of European integration. 
 
Arguably, the importance of the practical knowledge that has been offered by the 
Baltic States to their existing and potential partners (including New Zealand) is not 
difficult to appreciate as it could bring some visible results almost immediately. 
Murray McCully, the New Zealand’s current Foreign Minister, framed his vision on 
cooperation with the new EU stating that “the EU is also of great interest to New 
Zealand for various tangible reasons: for most purposes, it’s the world’s largest 
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single economy”.206 The word ‘tangible’ becomes extremely important in the time 
of economic recession.    
 
The traditional European regionalism and some of its newer vectors in the Central-
Eastern Europe could be conceptually applied to our case through the prism of the 
globalised interactions, too. For example, Haas pointed on the “coexistence of 
global and regional multilateral institutions and practices”207 in the post-1990s 
world. Elaborating on the issue, Newhouse argued that the European contemporary 
regionalism (the EU is arguably a major part of this process) is developing 
simultaneously with the continent’s involvement in globalisation.208        
 
During the first years since regaining independence, the Baltic States had been busy 
restructuring their macroeconomic frameworks while sometimes losing their focus 
on the level of industrial competitiveness, especially with the neighbouring Nordic 
countries.209 In this very period, the Baltics together with the other Central-Eastern 
European countries also became excessively dependent of “foreign-financed 
growth”.210 However, the macroeconomic changes combined with the revolutionary 
policy in taxation (the best example of which is the flat tax policy in Estonia) 
quickly led to some remarkable results. In 2007, the year of remarkable GDP growth 
in the country, the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted a meaningful trend – 
Estonia started investing abroad. Pallum commented:     
With more than 1000 companies, Estonia is the largest source of foreign direct 
investment in neighbouring Latvia. In addition, […] Estonian capital is settling 
more and more in Russia, Lithuania and Finland, but also in countries distant to us 
                                                 
206
 McCully, ‘Europa Lecture’.    
207
 Haas, p. 446.  
208John Newhouse, ‘Europe's Rising Regionalism’ in Foreign Affairs, January-February 1997. Available from 
<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19970101faessay3740/john-newhouse/europe-s-rising-regionalism.html>.   
209
 ‘Industrial Restructuring in Eastern Europe’ in Institute of Baltic Studies. Available from 
<http://www.ibs.ee/content/view/24/30/>.    
210
 Marek Tiits et al., ‘Catching up, forging ahead or falling behind? Central and Eastern European 
development in 1990-2005’ in Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, Vol. 21, issue 
1, March 2008, p. 82.     
 65 
geographically like Ukraine, Georgia, Bulgaria, Romania, the Western Balkans and 
even Morocco.211   
 
In figures, Estonia’s direct investment position by countries is shown in Table 5. 
Notably, the country’s investments abroad rose by 47.33 per cent in 2007 if 
compared to the 2006 data. 
 
Table 5: Estonia’s Direct Investment Position by Countries (Million EURO)   
Country DI, 2006 DI, per cent of total, 2006 DI, 2007 DI, per cent of total, 2007 
Latvia 953.10 34.5 1,367.90 33.6 
Lithuania 886.78 32.1 1,218.97 30.0 
Russia 243.96 8.8 336.58 8.3 
Cyprus 232.70 8.4 320.48 7.9 
Finland 131.13 4.7 163.72 4.0 
Ukraine 65.26 2.4 106.16 2.6 
Belarus 51.55 1.9 62.03 1.5 
Spain 31.66 1.1 47.29 1.2 
Italy 30.02 1.1 104.28 2.6 
Bulgaria 22.22 0.8 37.96 0.9 
Others 114.08 4.2 304.59 7.4 
Total 2,762.46 100 4,069.96 100 
 
From the first look, the openness of the modern global economy makes it harder for 
a small country to keep its presumably unique image. To make the situation even 
more complicated, the classic notion of sovereignty – being understood as “supreme 
authority within a territory”212 – is gradually becoming associated with the past. 
However, not only the mighty stance of globalisation and its overwhelming strategic 
power are actually based on the in-depth knowledge of particular countries and 
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regions, but also those countries and regions respond defensively to globalisation, 
trying to “protect and preserve the established social and political order”.213 The 
“diversity of nationally-embedded knowledge systems”214 is yet another fact that 
crucially adds some weight to the argument that the globalised economy and its 
further successful development very much depend on “specific territorial 
characteristics”.215 Back in 2001, the News Corporation launched a 24-hour 
Mandarin-language cable TV channel in China – the emphasis of the deal was 
underscored by the company’s representative: “We won't do programs that are 
offensive in China”.216 One of the other working examples when a multi-national 
corporation is taking extra care of regional tendencies in the global business can be 
found at Fonterra, too. The New Zealand’s largest enterprise owned by 13,000 
farmers, Fonterra pays special attention to the Asia-Middle East vast region – its 
leadership team includes a Managing Director-Asia-Middle East who works along 
with Managing Director-Global Trade.217   
 
Arguably, given the significance of the two simultaneous developments 
(regionalism and globalisation) that have special relevance to Europe,218 the 
importance of the regions can hardly be underestimated in the field of international 
relations. Therefore, this chapter’s theoretical dimension has been represented by 
the phenomenon of regionalism in Europe and its modern variations, which have 
relevance to the Baltic States. The key point for New Zealand discovering the 
Baltics – the country may very well know how to successfully interact with its long-
term partners in the EU-15, but such an auxiliary knowledge needs to be framed by 
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the regional characteristics and vectors of the Baltic area. Alternatively, New 
Zealand may choose to give up on engaging with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to 
keep concentrating on the better known areas of the EU. In this case, it may gain 
tactically but lose strategically, and its knowledge of the enlarged EU will remain 
limited.  
 
3.2. The ‘been there, done that’ theme 
 
It is not for the first time New Zealand could be choosing a hub-like country to 
pursue its interests in a region. Since its accession to the EU in 1973, the UK has 
been serving as New Zealand’s main ‘gateway’ to Europe. Having been able to 
gather nations as different as Brunei, Chile and Singapore under the ‘umbrella’ of 
the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership,219 New Zealand virtually 
established several new ‘hubs’ – this time in Asia and the South America. From 
there, not only did New Zealand receive free access to the three important markets, 
but also the country could quickly and successfully discover the wider regions 
around those particular areas. Partially as a result of such activity, New Zealand 
already concluded the Free-Trade Agreements with China and Malaysia and is 
currently eyeing to have free access to Vietnamese, Peruan and other markets.  
 
Due to a number of factors, free trade with the EU seems like a matter of distant 
future. Nevertheless, New Zealand is arguably capable to possess its structural 
readiness to form more ‘gateways’ on the European continent. Having established 
the ‘on the ground’ representation in Poland and Sweden, New Zealand entered the 
Nordic and Baltic regions and even generated some informative findings. For 
example, NZ MFAT already noted that Estonia’s “strong economy, EU membership 
and close ties with its Scandinavian and Baltic neighbours make it of increasing 
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relevance to New Zealand”.220 The Lithuania’s role as “an entrepot for Russia”221 
has been monitored by the NZ MFAT, too. Presumably, New Zealand diplomats 
define ‘entrepot’ as a political phenomenon rather than geographical – Lithuania is 
neighbouring the westernmost Russian enclave only but has no borders with the 
mainland Russia on the east. With Latvia, New Zealand “is seeking to strengthen 
bilateral ties”.222 But it is still unclear at the moment whether or not the factors of 
‘increasing relevance’, ‘closeness to Russia’, ‘pronounced desire to strengthen ties’ 
or simple curiosity will lead towards establishing a more visible presence of New 
Zealand in the Baltic States. A plain assumption that New Zealand will have no 
hurdles on its way to reach the Baltics via one country from the trio requires a 
serious back-up. Moreover, in 1992, Ambassador McGhie found “little knowledge 
of New Zealand”223 in the Baltics while presenting his credentials as New Zealand 
Ambassador in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Furthermore, a research paper 
conducted in the relatively unexplored field of New Zealand interactions with a 
post-Soviet counterpart (Ukraine) showed a set of obstacles to overcome before 
brining the two parties closer. Different foreign policy priorities, sporadic 
encounters, confused mutual perceptions and missed chances in communications 
were argued as major barriers on the way of enhancing cooperation between New 
Zealand and its potentially large-scale partner in the post-Soviet territory. 224  
 
Despite the Baltic States are no Ukraine (by total area, demographics, current 
political regimes, freedom/corruption indicators and levels of involvement in both 
European and global integration), it does not necessarily make their positive 
structural characteristics more visible thus potentially more attractive for New 
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Zealand and vice versa. Extrapolating the already studied pattern on similar 
interrelations, it is suggested that the obvious lack of mutual introduction (like in the 
case with Ukraine)225 is actively playing its role in the process of activating 
relationships between New Zealand and the Baltics, too. However, every situation 
has differences and therefore there is always a chance to find some unique 
paradigms in the interaction-building process.  
 
Walking in the ‘fog’ of newly-born paradigms does not however mean walking in 
the complete ‘darkness’ of non-existing relationships between subjects. In our case, 
such relationships do exist, and it gives an opportunity to follow the dynamics of 
interactions, indicate their potential and make some algorithmically framed 
conclusions about the future of interactions. In this respect, the ‘what if’ or ‘if only’ 
types of questions can play an unproductive and misleading role, pushing this 
research work to the brink of becoming a hypothetical guessing opus. On the 
contrary, the already identified structural frameworks, distinguishable preconditions 
or lack of such preconditions will be influencing the dynamics of cooperation, 
shaping its degree of compatibility. 
 
3.2.1. How much of the Baltics is seen from the Warsaw Embassy?   
 
Evidently, the Baltics’ regional links with Poland (except the Poland-Lithuania 
traditional historical closeness) are not that strong as one may perceive. As a 
founding member of the Visegrad Four, Poland has traditionally strong links with 
the other members of the grouping, namely the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary. Also, the level of the Polish-Ukrainian regional cooperation, especially in 
the context of co-hosting the UEFA Euro-2012 Championship, is comprehensive 
enough, too. Furthermore, with Estonia being ethnically and economically close to 
Finland and historically and economically to Denmark and Sweden, and Latvia 
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having historical and economical ties with Germany, the probability for New 
Zealand to miss some valuable opportunities in the Baltic States is increasingly 
gaining some empirical weight.  
 
Marianna Jolla, Business Consultant at Enterprise Estonia, recalled the fact of a 
meeting held between New Zealand and Estonian business representatives during 
the 2007 CeBIT exhibition in Germany.226 The two parties discussed the potential of 
New Zealand-Estonia relations in business, more specifically in the sphere of 
informational technology, and expressed their interest and readiness to enhance 
cooperation, but the meeting never led towards any further discussions, not to 
mention about signing any formal agreements.227        
 
A somewhat different feedback on interaction with the Baltics was received from a 
company that has already established business relations with an Estonian 
counterpart. Wende Ward, an executive of Prattley Industries, noted that the Baltics 
“are interested in New Zealand farming practice and how it can be applied in their 
own countries”; she also added that New Zealand is perceived in the Baltics as 
leader “in the field and our equipment has a good reputation”.228 Ms Ward advised 
Kiwi manufacturers to export to the Baltics.229 
 
3.2.2. Eastern Europe as a provider of global services  
 
Historically, the British Empire knew the Baltic States as “producers of raw 
materials, notably flax and timber”.230 Another point of attraction was that the 
Baltics were regarded as “observation points from which [Britain] could keep an eye 
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on Russian events and seize whatever opportunities Russian trade might offer”.231 
At present, the Baltics, together with the post-Cold War Central-Eastern Europe, are 
widening their profiles and getting a lot of favourable attention in the segment of 
global services. As an example, neither of the Baltic States was featuring among the 
top forty countries in the A.T. Kearney Global Services Location Index in 2005; 
New Zealand then took 34th place with India, China, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Singapore being top five. But the ranking was significantly adjusted two years later, 
reflecting to the rapid development of “newer contenders in Central and Eastern 
Europe”,232 with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania holding correspondingly 15th, 17th 
and 28th places (New Zealand took 44th rank). Having Bulgaria (9th), Slovakia (12th), 
the Czech Republic (16th) and Poland (18th) in the top-20, there is a strong set of 
evidences supporting the attractiveness of the EU’s newcomers. The ‘business 
environment’ coefficient along shows Estonia on the world’s 10th place in 2007, 
only behind the group of nine highly developed countries – Singapore, Germany, 
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, United States, the Republic of Ireland, France 
and New Zealand.233  
 
New Zealand media noted the positive developments in the Baltics with a material 
published by the country’s most prestigious business weekly, The National Business 
Review. In August 2007, the edition called Estonia “a good place to start if you have 
a business-driven desire to do some potentially rewarding foundational studies on 
the post-Cold War Europe”.234 Estonia’s obvious inclination to the e-economy – 
paperless sessions of the local government, e-voting system for parliamentary 
elections, the internet connected to all Estonian schools, the Estonian-Danish free 
phoning miracle Skype – was highlighted in the article as well.235 
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In 2009, the Global Services Location Index showed the Baltic States being able to 
almost repeat their 2007 results. Once again, Estonia was leading the trio from the 
world’s 18th place, followed by Lithuania and Latvia correspondingly taking 21st 
and 22nd places.236 Additionally, Estonia’s ‘business environment’ rating was 8th 
best – 0.05 points better than of New Zealand’s and only 0.02 points shy of the 
Australia’s results in this important segment of the survey.237        
 
3.3. Operational compatibility: are there any obstacles?        
 
Similarly to the previous chapter, the operational angle of this analysis is 
predominantly framed by the data generated with the help of the survey. This time 
the respondents who represented New Zealand and the Baltic States were asked to 
express their opinion on the idea to choose one of the Baltics as ‘gateway’ for New 
Zealand to promote itself in the region.   
 
Question 2 – Appendix 1 (for New Zealand respondents):   
Does an idea to choose one of the three Baltic States as a ‘gateway’ for promoting 
New Zealand image, business interests, scientific achievements and political values 
in the Baltics have a perspective?  
 
1. 53 per cent of individuals (10 people) gave positive answers to this question with 
one person (5 per cent) giving no answer.  
2. 88 per cent of elite representatives (7 people) expressed different level of 
negativity to the idea of a ‘gateway’.  
3. 82 per cent of students (9 individuals out of 11) responded positively.  
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Characteristically for this part of the survey, its main trend was that the two groups 
of respondents (elite representatives and students) demonstrated diametrically 
different opinions on the subject. Furthermore, the only elite group’s respondent 
who answered the question positively (“a valid idea”), immediately stated that it 
would be “a big shift from current thinking […] orientated towards Western 
Europe”. In addition, one of the respondents from the student’s group gave the 
answer – “[a] bilateral approach seems more optimistic” – that could not be 
allocated to either positive or negative responses.  
 
There were three distinct patterns found in the answers of the New Zealand sample. 
The first pattern would be framed as the Baltic States are very different for one to 
be chosen as a ‘gateway’ to the three countries (16 per cent of all respondents or 
three people). As an example, one of the survey participants noted that “different 
actors or organisations might lead to different gateways” (elite). The other 
respondent’s expression was that “[e]ach of the three Baltics is very different, with 
different languages and cultures”; the same person also questioned the possible 
assumption “that promotion in one of the Baltics would result in promotion in the 
other Baltics” (elite). Finally for this pattern, a respondent was very specific in 
suggesting that if “you need to go to the trade show that attract the most people in 
your industry, this could be in any of the [Baltic] States” (elite).  
 
Next pattern was found in two answers only and had direct relevance to the New 
Zealand Embassy is Warsaw. One of the respondents from the elite group strongly 
argued that the Baltics “can be serviced through on Embassy in Poland, which […] 
is our ‘gateway’”. The other elite representative suggested that the Warsaw location 
“gives roughly equal emphasis to each of the three Baltic accreditations”.  
 
The third pattern was indicated by three respondents and driven by a degree of 
practicality for the idea of the New Zealand ‘hub’ in the Baltic States to be 
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implemented. One of the respondents underscored that it would not be “feasible for 
New Zealand to open embassies in all these countries”, concluding that the idea of 
the ‘hub’ “would make sense” (student). The other student backed his/her positive 
answer by adding that “it could be a practical option”. The next argument in favour 
of choosing one of the Baltics as a ‘gateway’ for New Zealand in the region was 
based on the fact that New Zealand “has limited resources” thus “it makes sense to 
focus their infrastructure in one location to serve the other Baltic States” (student).       
 
Summary of Trends Summary of Patterns 
Elites and students have diametrically 
different opinions on the subject.  
The Baltics States are too different to 
chose one of them to become New 
Zealand’s ‘gateway’ to all three. 
 In relations to the Baltic States, the role 
of the New Zealand Embassy in Poland 
has to be explored further. 
 The idea to choose on of the Baltics to 
be a ‘gateway’ for New Zealand in the 
region is practical and makes sense.   
 
Question 3 – Appendix 2 (the Baltics):    
Does an idea to choose one of the three Baltic States as a ‘gateway’ for promoting 
New Zealand image, business interests, scientific achievements and political values 
in the Baltics have a perspective? If ‘yes’, is there a chance to have a reverse effect 
– when your region will choose New Zealand for the same reason?  
 
1. 75 per cent of respondents (twenty seven individuals) answered this question 
positively with 19 per cent (seven people) giving negative answer. 
2. Two respondents gave no answer (one of them – a Latvian elite representative – 
was not even asked as the time for the interview had run out). 
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3. The Estonian group was overwhelmingly positive to the idea framed by the 
question with 88 per cent (fourteen respondent) answering ‘yes’; the Latvian 
respondents followed with 67 per cent (keeping in mind that one personality did not 
have a chance to answer the question), and the 64 per cents of the survey 
participants from the Lithuanian group responded positively. 
 
While generating no specific trends, this segment of the survey helped to generalise 
four distinct patterns. Echoing with their New Zealand counterparts, some of the 
respondents from the Baltics States, directly or indirectly, acknowledged the refrain 
on uniqueness of the already ‘grown-up’ independent Baltics. This pattern brings a 
significant degree of sceptical realism into the concept of a New Zealand ‘hub’, but 
the common attitude still remains positive. For example, in one opinion, New 
Zealand perceives the Baltics “as a group rather than individually”; at the same 
time, as suggested, “each of the Baltic States is pursuing their own interests and 
paths in achieving wider recognition” (elite, Estonia). It was also noted that “the 
probability for a Lithuanian from Vilnius to come to Tallinn to require some 
information is very small” (elite, Estonia).  Another commentary was on the fact 
that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania “are ultimately independent countries”, adding 
that “[e]ach country has strength in different areas” (elite, Estonia). At the same 
time, a Lithuanian student saw his country’s uniqueness as an opportunity to “show 
our national values” to New Zealand.     
 
Ten of the survey participants, whilst welcoming ‘more New Zealand’ in the region 
via its ‘gateway’ in one of the Baltics, decided to elaborate on the practical thoughts, 
actual steps or concrete actions to enhance relationships. An Estonian elite 
representative suggested that it “may lead to good opportunities in the Northern 
Europe, Scandinavia and the Baltics”, adding that “[t]here are so many good signs 
of this idea [to be realised]”. Should it be chosen as a New Zealand ‘hub’ to the 
Baltic States, Latvia “would like to broaden its international cooperation” (Latvia, 
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student). The promotion of “tourism and cultural exchange” was picked up by 
another Latvian student. A very similar sentiment was expressed by a respondent 
from the Estonian elite group, stating that “cultural programmes [and] sister-cities 
programmes […] can bring people together”. The latter opinion was backed by a 
participant who noted that “something like New Zealand Expo [in the region] is 
overdue”, suggesting that his native Estonia could welcome New Zealand as an 
investor in the country’s dairy sector as well as through the partnership “on the city-
city basis” (elite). A survey participant from Lithuania called for New Zealand to be 
“more proactive” in order to realise the idea of having a ‘hub’ in her country (elite). 
A respondent from the student group went further, visualising New Zealand’s 
expertise and capabilities to “successfully promote the image of Estonia (or any 
other Baltic country) in whole Pacific region or/and Australia and even Indo-China 
and Indonesia” (Estonia). The remaining two statements, which could be allocated 
for the ‘concrete actions’ pattern, were made by Estonian elite representatives on the 
subject of raising knowledge. For example, New Zealand and Estonia were 
suggested to “develop contacts, […] learn more about economic achievements” of 
each other, and this could lead to the situation when “Estonia could become a 
priority market” for New Zealand. The other respondent argued that “the knowledge 
about each other has to be raised through common study work [and] international 
affairs programmes”.    
 
 The issue of common interests of the EU framed the next pattern of this particular 
bit of the survey. Even though it was mentioned by two respondents only, its 
complexity was very much underscored. The nowadays necessity (“the most 
important thing”) for the Baltic States “to act in common interests of the European 
Union” was chosen by a Latvian student as an argument to reject the idea of the 
New Zealand’s ‘gateway’ in the region. However, it was indirectly challenged by a 
Lithuanian elite representative who welcomed the idea on the basis that the EU 
Member States could “learn [from New Zealand] how to deal with ecology and 
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energy problems”. The latter issues are presumably in the common interest of the 
whole EU, not only the Baltics. 
 
Three individuals (all from Estonia) recalled similar interactions, contextualising 
them with the idea of the ‘hub’ and thus framing the it has been done before 
pattern. For example, a statement that “many companies have decided to base their 
‘hub’ to one of the three Baltic countries” was indirectly backed by a comment that 
a ‘gateway’ to a region is a “usual tactic for several companies”. There was also a 
commentary suggesting that the contacts between New Zealand and the Baltics 
already exist. There was an example given that an Estonian post-graduate student 
(known to the respondent) had been doing a PhD-level research in Wellington.          
 
Summary of Patterns 
The Baltics are independent and unique 
Concrete actions 
Common interests of the EU 
It has been done before 
 
3.4. Mini-conclusion  
 
The ever-present European regionalism (and particularly its distinctly unique 
Central-Eastern variation) was chosen to be tested as a theoretical framework for 
this chapter. A number of factors – such as New Zealand successful experience in 
dealing with different regions worldwide, the Baltics’ advantageous location, their 
noted aspirations to lead the region and the Central-Eastern Europe’s emergence as 
a reliable provider of global services – suggested that New Zealand could 
significantly benefit from establishing a formal or informal ‘gateway’ in one of the 
Baltic States. However, this approach (in spite of its approval by majority of the 
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survey participants) has clashed with some of realism-driven arguments, 
diminishing the presumably benefit-providing regional vectors within the Baltics. 
Structurally, the two sides are ‘ready to go’. Operationally, there are few important 
elements required to be acknowledged. For example, the process of cooperation is 
evidently lacking serious actions from both sides (i.e. sister cities, EXPO, on the 
ground tourism promotion, student exchange others). Importantly, there is always an 
issue of ‘bottom line’ contextualised with any of ‘hub’-related activities. Also, the 
Warsaw Embassy’s role in the process has to be studied much further and over time, 
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4. Why Estonia?  
 
Once it has been argued that, firstly, New Zealand will benefit significantly from 
developing its closer interconnections in the region of the Baltic States, and, 
secondly, the idea to choose one of the three Baltic countries as a formal or informal 
‘hub’ has a number of advantageous points, the next logical step is to actually 
choose a location for the ‘hub’. This dissertation’s suggestion of making such a 
choice in favour of Estonia needs further investigation. Commencing with a brief 
historic overview on New Zealand-Estonian connections in the past and some of 
Estonia-related facts, this particular chapter will be dedicated to analysing the 
concept of the ‘Estonian hub’ from theoretical, structural and operational angles – to 
keep the discussion on the final research question in the same methodological line 
with the first two.    
 
4.1. Theoretical Dimension: An Intergovernmental Estonia      
 
For New Zealand to be able to single Estonia out of the EU’s 27 Member States is a 
highly challenging but not a ‘mission impossible’ task. The historical build-up of the 
European continent and the innovative political order of the EU allow the Member 
States to maintain their very own political profiles whilst being under the unifying 
supranational umbrella at the same time. Indeed, it is hard to imagine the UK, 
Germany or France to become entirely dissolved as entities within the EU. The 
same applies to smaller countries like the Baltics, too. As argued by Vernygora and 
Chaban, there is a direct linkage between a possibility for the Member States to co-
exist, cooperate and prosper in the EU and the fundamental notion of equality that 
has been guaranteed by the EU’s legislation.238 According to the Maastricht Treaty 
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on European Union, the true equality can be achieved by respecting “the national 
identities of its Member States”.239 Surely, this approach was designed to lead the 
Member States towards realising the need of having a closer and more cohesive 
unified polity that would be capable enough “to assert its identity on the 
international scene”.240 For Estonia, being a Member State of the EU, means that it 
is participating in the process that is with necessity approaching the moment when 
the supranational establishment is to eventually become a truly global political actor 
of the modern age. It also means that the EU’s emerging political order, with the 
time, will be making the linkages between economic and political objectives almost 
impossible to disentangle.241 Moreover, the adoption and ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty have paved the way for the EU to have a more coherent foreign policy and a 
more enhanced military stance.  
 
Nevertheless and on the contrary to a number of unifying and even federalist vectors 
within the EU at present, its innovative nature still allows the Member States to act 
and perform on the intergovernmental arena. The controversial as well as non-
conventional Open Method of Coordination242 is one of the best examples of 
intergovermentalism being very much alive in the EU. Another example would be 
the newest version of the CFSP that, according to the norms of the Lisbon Treaty 
lost its pillar status, was broadened in scope and retained its distinct 
intergovernmental nature. Giving an example of France, Smith ironically noted that 
it would not “agree to be represented in global affairs over a five-year term by 
someone from Greece or Estonia”.243 All these facts prove the point that 
intergovernmental tendencies and mechanisms are very contemporary and 
relevant for the present form of the EU. In this dissertation’s case, Estonia’s visible 
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role on the intergovernmental stage could be advantageous for New Zealand 
enhancing its cooperation with the Baltics. It is better to enter the region with proper 
introduction via the country that has a more recognisable geo-political silhouette. 
This dissertation argues that such a country for New Zealand in the region of the 
Baltics is Estonia.       
 
4.1.1. Constant drive for independence      
 
One of Europe’s most pragmatic and secular countries,244 Estonia has always been 
quick to react on the issues on independence. In 1917, it was the only national 
region to which the Provisional Russian government granted autonomy.245 In 1980s, 
the initial movement towards independence was predictably characterised by both 
‘liberal’ and ‘illiberal’ forms of nationalism – on the one side, ethnic minorities 
actively participated in the process of making Estonia independent; on the other 
side, Estonians could not forget historical facts of “Stalinist deportations […] and 
russification policies”246 that took place in the country during the Soviet times. 
Having experienced “what turned out to be a wholly false, coercive integrating 
force”247 and its collapse, Estonia went through the period of “resurgent 
nationalism”.248 Reflecting on the Estonians’ predominantly negative attitude to the 
Soviet past, some scholars qualified procedures for Russian-speaking community to 
obtain Estonian citizenship as “severe”.249 However, some others were not as critical 
noticing “the growing acceptance of the Estonian state by the resident Russian 
speakers”.250 
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Having spent decades under the Kremlin’s strict control before regaining 
independence in 1991, Estonia was however one of the most unique pieces in the 
puzzle of the Soviet administrative hierarchy. In accordance to the USSR-building 
formula that was set up by Joseph Stalin, “[…] the nationality which gives its name 
to a given Soviet republic […] must not have too small a population; it should have 
a population of, say, not less, but more than a million”.251 Contradicting to this rule, 
Estonia with less than a million people was one of the four exceptions (the others 
were the Turkmen, the Kyrgyz and the Karelo-Finnish republics) to become a Soviet 
titular republic with the formal rights of a state. The two following reasons were 
critical for Estonia to be among the USSR’s highest administrative-territorial cast of 
fifteen titular republics and have its own constitution. First reason – it was 
bordering foreign countries,252 which to Estonia were Finland and Sweden lying 
across the Baltic Sea. Secondly, it was an independent sovereign state before 
suffering brutal annexation in 1940.  
 
In spite of being absolutely hypothetical, the right to secede from the USSR was one 
of the main constitutional rights of the Soviet Union’s titular republics declared by 
every Soviet Constitution from 1924 to 1977.253 According to the so-called Stalin 
1936 Constitution, the Soviet Union was “a federal state, formed on the basis of the 
voluntary association of the Soviet Socialist Republics having equal rights”.254 In 
reality, the Russian nation’s dominating role in the multilingual and multicultural 
society of the former Soviet Union was a core element of the hierarchy and was 
“encouraged by the regime to take pride in the fact that they belonged to a ‘great 
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power”.255 Interestingly enough, as argued by Chaban and Vernygora, New Zealand 
political elites were aware of “the Soviet Union’s specific national structure”.256 
Desmond Costello, a New Zealand diplomat who was a member of the country’s 
first legation in the USSR, noted in 1944: 
The […] Republics of the USSR are in no sense ‘daughter nations’ of Russia. 
Russia (RSFSR)257 is the largest of them, that is all. They are separate nations, often 
differing widely from one another in language and traditions and which have been 
linked together first by the historical accident of having formed part of the Tsarist-
Russian Empire, secondly by their (more or less willing) acceptance of the ideology 
and purposes of the Bolshevik Party.258 
 
In Estonia, a certain degree of negativity towards the former dominant power goes 
with “the global ethnic identity revival”259 and its visible tendencies in the post-
Soviet territory. Taking pride of being an Estonian can be treated as a payback to the 
times of “the assimilation strategy” 260  that “was de-facto applied to [national] 
minorities of the Soviet Union” by the Kremlin political power. Pursuing its 
negative approach towards the Soviet past, it is suggested that Estonia does not 
really ‘fight’ a particular neighbouring super-power that could be easily located. On 
the contrary, its strong antipathy is, in fact, towards “a particular ideology and 
socio-political system, Stalinism”.261 In some cases, however, the past could still 
play a dramatic role in Estonia, not without an influence from the country’s largest 
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neighbour. In April-May 2007, as consequences of the Estonian government’s 
decision on moving the Soviet war memorial (known as the Bronze Soldier) from 
the central part of Tallinn to another place in town, the Estonian capital experienced 
riots by ethnic Russians; moreover, violent protests by Russian pro-Kremlin 
nationalist youth took place in front of the Estonian Embassy in Moscow and ‘cyber 
attacks’ on Estonian governmental computers were launched.262 The developments 
were openly described by Zbignew Brzezinski as “threats from Russia” – an EU 
Member State Estonia became the object of “economic sanctions and disruptive 
cyberwarfare”.263 In May 2007, Laar’s article to The New York Times featured the 
former Estonian Prime Minister’s concern that Stalin is once again becoming a hero 
in Russia.264 A month later, The New Zealand Herald quoted Kardi Liik, Director of 
Tallinn’s International Centre for Defence Studies, expressing concerns that it was 
“difficult for Moscow to accept that a part of the former Russian empire is now part 
of the EU”.265  
 
4.1.2. Historical connections     
 
There was a strong argument that, since the formal foundation of the nation in 1840, 
New Zealand’s immigration policy was “highly selective and exclusivist”.266 At the 
same time, this could hardly be offered as the main explanation for a very small 
number of Estonians living in New Zealand before the World War II. In twentieth 
century, the first direct contact that Britain had with the officials from the Baltics 
occurred in January 1918 only – Estonian and Latvian delegations were seeking the 
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British official vision on independence of the Baltic nationalities.267 The 1921 
Census showed that only 8 Estonian-born people were residing in the former British 
colony at the time (as compared to 14 Latvians and 8 Lithuanians).268    
 
According to a unique evidence collected by Asta Gale and Ali Kapp, the first 
sizable group of Estonian people (116 in total) arrived to New Zealand on 20 June 
1949.269 Those Estonians were post-World War II refugees, and their initial 
settlement was established in Pahiatua Camp,270 together with hundreds of other 
refugees from Eastern Europe (Polish, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, 
Belarusians others). The ship with young Ortvin Sarapu271 who was later nicknamed 
in New Zealand as Mr. Chess – ‘Hellenic Prince’ – arrived in Wellington in October 
1950.272 Having been assisted by the New Zealand Government to leave the 
devastated Europe and come to New Zealand, the refugees had the legal obligation 
to work for two years.273 With the time, Estonian newcomers got resettled 
throughout the country with about 50 people choosing Auckland, 22 – Christchurch, 
and the remaining group went to Wellington and Dunedin.274 The data taken from 
the 1951 Census showed that New Zealand became home for 212 Estonians (423 
Latvians and 184 Lithuanians).275         
 
Back in 1950s, an Estonian immigrant in New Zealand had not only a new life to be 
built but a story to tell and a social task to accomplish. Tõnu Loorpärg, Estonia’s 
current Honourary Consul in New Zealand (residing in the Wellington region), was 
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in the very first group of Estonian post-World War II refugees. Describing his 
personal experience of being an Estonian Kiwi, he noted:  
Most of my generation was brought up on an ethic, which focused on keeping the 
idea of Estonian Independence alive despite apparently overwhelming odds. In the 
context of living as an Estonian in New Zealand this has meant (especially for those 
of us with Estonian names) a continued need to explain where Estonia is located 
geographically, to explain and differentiate Estonians from ‘Russians/Soviets’ and 
the need to create awareness among the New Zealand population about the dangers 
of Soviet totalitarian expansionism and what this had meant in our homeland.276 
 
Estonian family names (some of them are extremely difficult to be pronounced by a 
native English speaker) never made life easier for their holders. Very often, it would 
lead to numerous confusions and even anecdotal situations. For example, Sarapu 
remembered that he was once called by an Australian newspaper as “New Zealand 
Maori” after winning the open Australian chess championship back in 1957 – the 
media source simply could not determine the national background of the gifted 
chess player’s family name.277    
 
4.1.3. Re-establishing diplomatic relations      
 
The former smallest Soviet titular republic whose existence in the period between 
and after the two world wars was very much depended “on the policies pursued by 
Germany and Russia”,278 Estonia, not without a significant effort, took its 
‘European’ political outfit back. It had to proclaim its independence twice (in 1918 
from Russia and in 1991 from the Soviet Union), and it is visibly feeling “grateful to 
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be in the European fold”279 now. Charlie McCreedy, the EU Commissioner for 
Internal Market and Services, argued that the EU allowed many of smaller countries 
“not to be depended on big neighbours”.280 Being the first post-Soviet country to 
replace the rouble with its national currency back in June 1992,281 Estonia quickly 
managed to get credits for its remarkable political and economic recovery 
transforming itself into a democratic “plugged-in member of the global information 
economy”.282  
 
Since the diplomatic relations were re-established in 1992, New Zealand’s first 
experience of extended bilateral negotiations with Estonia occurred in 1998-1999. 
The two parties held talks on “tariffs and domestic support of agricultural 
products”283 in the framework of Estonia’s WTO negotiations. The agreement was 
successfully reached in February 1999, leading the way for Estonia to join the 
WTO. From this point, the official contacts between the two countries started 
carrying a certain degree of substance.  
 
In October 2001, the then newly elected Estonian President Arnold Rüütel in his 
discussion with New Zealand Ambassador Christopher Butler focused on prospects 
of cooperation between the two countries in the areas of “culture, agriculture and 
environment protection”.284 President Rüütel also noted about his country’s 
admiration of “the preservation of the Maori ethnic identity […] and strengthening 
of Maori cultural traditions”285 in New Zealand.  
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Less than two years later, in January 2003, during his meeting with President 
Rüütel, New Zealand new Ambassador Payton promised “to do his best to 
contribute to the promotion of […] bilateral relations”.286 His activities in the region 
led to the NZ MFAT’s recognition of Estonia’s “entrepot role”287 for New Zealand-
originated goods to the Northern European destinations. And finally, in June 2008, 
answering a question on Baltic States during his Europa Lecture, Minister Peters, 
who visited Estonia in 2006, described it as “quite amazing”.288 
 
4.1.4. Similar attitudes – Estonia, Finland and New Zealand      
 
The well-known similarities between Finland and Estonia were evidently noted by 
Richard Lewis in his popular ethnographical study about the Finnish society. 
According to him, the Estonians who “definitely have the Finnish model in close 
focus”289 were separated from the Finns around 1000 B.C., but they are still “closely 
related […] both racially and linguistically (many Estonians speak almost perfect 
Finnish)”.290 Interestingly enough, in Lewis’ book, there was a somewhat surprising 
New Zealand connection in the discussion about the Nordic people. Whilst 
describing pragmatism and straight-forwardness of the Finns, the author mentioned 
about a survey conducted on attitudes in fifty nations worldwide – the paper results 
showed the Finns and the New Zealanders as the “least susceptible to flattery”.291  
 
There is another similarity between New Zealand and Finland, this time it is a well-
known fact. New Zealand is widely respected for being the first nation in the world 
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to declare equal voting rights for women and men; Finland is remembered for 
becoming the first European nation to do so.292 
 
4.1.5. Baltic leaders who made difference  
 
From the beginning of 1990s, the Baltic States were noted by a number of capable 
politicians who rose on the waves of the pro-independence movement. With Lennart 
Meri becoming Estonia’s President in October 1992, not only his very own country 
received a remarkable statesman to lead it to the future, but all three Baltic States 
got their informal and well-respected spokesman for the first time. The highly 
educated personality who remembered the times of the pre-World War II sovereign 
Estonia, grew up in a diplomat’s family in Paris and Berlin and survived the 
Siberian gulag,293 Lennart Meri was never shy to condemn the 1939 Molotov-
Ribbentrop (or Stalin-Hitler) pact as “the last-gasp attempt of two colonial empires 
to divide the world as if it were a birthday cake”.294 President Meri’s name was also 
associated with numerous legends and even anecdotal situations, which would have 
strong connections with his identity of being an Estonian. For example, during the 
official meeting with the US President Clinton in the White House, Lennart Meri 
was asked by his American counterpart to show Estonia on the luxurious model of 
the globe. Answering the question, Meri took a marker and drew a thick cross 
exactly on Estonia’s location.295         
 
Back in 2006, after Toomas Hendrik Ilves was elected by the Estonian parliament to 
serve as the country’s new President, the Baltic States made highlights worldwide – 
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by that time the former foreign nationals were elected as leaders of all three Baltic 
countries. With Valdas Adamkus (a Kaunas-born former US citizen) who initiated 
the trend in Lithuania in 1999, it was maintained by Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga (a Riga-
born former Canadian citizen) in Latvia year later and completed by President Ilves 
(a Stockholm-born former US citizen) in Estonia. 
 
Since the end of the Lennart Meri political era in 2001 – the popularity of the former 
Estonian President could hardly be matched by any politician in the region at the 
time – the informal honourable palm of the Baltics’ most recognisable politician 
was however shifted to the Latvian President Vīķe-Freiberga (period in office: 
1999-2007), a “widely respected émigré and academic”296 with a PhD from McGill 
University in Montreal. Many commentators argue that the current Estonian 
President Ilves has now become the “new Baltic face”.297 In one of his known 
expressions, President Ilves stated that Estonia should be aiming to become “another 
boring Nordic country”,298 clearly visualising his country’s destiny to be in the 
group of non-corrupt, transparent, liberal and democratic Nordic states (Finland, 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden).   
 
Indeed, Estonia is a forward-looking nation. A closer partnership with countries like 
New Zealand is seen as logical. Marko Mihkelson, an influential representative of 
the new wave of the Estonian political elite, underscored the importance of 
introducing New Zealand in Estonia not only as “the Lord of the Rings country [that 
is situated] very far away and only in a dream”.299 His statement sounded more like 
a friendly invitation to New Zealand to cooperate more with Estonia and its 
region: 
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[W]e have had already quite significant political contacts, and it is a good pace for 
the future. The sizes of our countries are similar in a way that we can be opened to 
each other much easier.300  
 
Very much similar to New Zealand, Estonia is rather small in population but 
arguably “rich in content”.301 On the level of the state and from within the Estonian 
society, the Baltic country is positioning itself with the help of the following four 
paradigms. The undisputed Nordic influence (discipline, emphasis on sustainability 
and thinking about ‘tomorrow’) comfortably resides together with the openness and 
multi-cultural features, which are more of the Eastern influence.302 There is also a 
strong sense of the nation’s deep historical roots that helped Estonia to prevail over 
wars, foreign rulers, disasters and harsh conditions of local climate. And finally, the 
country’s ability to create or/and quickly implement nouvelle technological tools 
deserves recognition – indeed, there many things that are already taken by Estonians 
for granted but “still science fiction” for many other countries.303       
 
4.2. A compatibility of a partner  
 
To date, there has been little evidence of New Zealand being properly introduced to 
Estonia and the broader Baltic region. If found available for the public, New 
Zealand-related informative material is either of a highly specific nature or 
extremely general. For example, the Tartu University Library holds a March 2003 
article published by a local agricultural edition Maamajandus that tells a short story 
of two New Zealand brothers – Geoff and Ron Howie – who successfully run a 
sizable dairy-sheep business located in the South Island.304 On the other side of the 
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informational equation, an example of a historio-georaphycal data about New 
Zealand – Uus-Meremaa: Dominion of New Zealand305 – published in Tartu in 1931 
and allocated at the same University Library, too.      
 
Nevertheless, in order to be noticed in Estonia, New Zealand is already on the prime 
spot as compared to all other nations. Toomas Luman, the President of the Estonian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, is holding the post of New Zealand’s 
Honorary Consul in Estonia from 2005.306 Not only Mr. Luman is directly involved 
in business development throughout the Baltic region, but he is also the Chairman of 
the Advisory board of the Tallinn University of Technology (the country’s only 
technical institution of higher education and the Estonian capital’s largest 
university).          
 
In the short historical period from 1991 to the present time, Estonia has been 
through many major events of global significance. A number of unique quantitative 
references, provided by Maddison in 2003, are helping to compare New Zealand’s 
and the Baltic States’ macroeconomic positions in 1991 (the year of the Soviet 
Union’s disappearance from the world’s political map) and ten years later. Table 6 
indicates the estimate of ‘per capita GDP’ in New Zealand, Estonia, Latvia and 
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Table 6: Per Capita Gross Domestic Product Estimated in 1990 International Geary-Khamis 
Dollars308    
 1991 2001 
New Zealand $ 13,514 $ 16,118 
Estonia $ 9,744 $ 11,505 
Latvia $ 8,888 $ 7,351 
Lithuania $ 8,139 $ 6.842 
Ukraine $ 5,485 $ 3,009 
Russian Federation $ 7,370 $ 5,435 
USSR $ 6,409 - 
 
On the year of the collapse of the Soviet communist empire, Estonia – the smallest 
of all titular Soviet nations – was the wealthiest at the same time. Latvia and 
Lithuania were among the leaders, too. By the way, the two engines of the Soviet 
economy (Russia and Ukraine) were far from making top of the table. In ten years 
since re-gaining independence, the Estonian position got even better advancing 18 
per cent from the previous result. The other two of the Baltics States dropped 
significantly by 17 and 16 per cent correspondingly for Latvia and Lithuania. Laar 
found his country’s success in “the balance between openness and national 
identity”.309 The overwhelming excitement as an aftermath from re-gaining 
independence had been quickly transforming into a desire to make the country’s 
‘comeback to Europe’ sooner rather than later. Having successfully joined the EU 
and NATO, Estonia experienced a remarkable economic boom fuelled by the 2006-
2007 “clearly excessive” credit growth with asset prices being “higher than justified 
by their fundamental indicators”.310 In 2006, the Baltic country’s real growth of 
GDP made to the double digit figure of 10.4 per cent.311 But it was only a matter of 
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time for the global economy to get into a recessional economic cycle, and the 
Estonian political elites were arguably aware of it. In July 2007, Pallum noted:  
So far – so good. But as a matter of fact because of the coincidence of more positive 
factors, economically speaking, we had been through a major crisis – the 1998 Asia 
and the Russian rouble crisis – this is for the first time our economy contracted, in 
1998-99. We have to look for one-two cycles economically and only then we will 
really see whether or not […] policies we have put in place are good enough to 
achieve what we want to achieve.312      
 
4.2.1. Battling through the turbulent times   
 
The sharp decline was only around the corner and saw Estonia’s GDP shrinking 5.1 
per cent in 2008 and 13.9 per cent the following year that was, according to 
Bloomberg reporter, “the biggest contraction in the EU behind neighbouring 
Latvia”.313 That particular period of time was sharply labelled by The Economist as 
“Eastern Europe’s misery”.314      
 
Indeed, Estonia is an interesting case study on how a smaller nation reacted in the 
turbulent times of the world’s economic recession. Having been able to accumulate 
“fiscal revenue during the [economic] boom years equal to 10 per cent of [the 
country’s] GDP”,315 Estonia not only survived the global shake-up but was one of 
the IMF-led donor countries that helped to rescue Latvia from the total economic 
collapse.316 Together with the Czech Republic and Poland, Estonia jointly gave 
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EURO 500 million to help the Latvian state in rescuing its currency lat.317 The 
conservative fiscal policy has been another fundamental cornerstone of the Estonian 
state since re-gaining independence. The pre-recession Estonia’s public debt 
accounted “for only about 5 per cent of GDP”.318 A high degree of the country’s 
financial system’s integration into Scandinavian banking groups319 has been 
continuously helping Estonia to remain resilient during the tough times.  
 
Paradoxically, the global financial meltdown gave Estonia a chance to be recognised 
not just as “the least bad [government] in Eastern Europe”320 but in a far less 
sarcastic way as well. In December 2009, The New York Times openly 
recommended the EU “to admit Estonia to […] [the] single currency area in 
2011”,321 giving credits to the country’s prudence “about foreign borrowing and 
fiscal discipline in the boom years”.322 The fact that Estonia became the latest 
addition to the EURO zone from 1 January 2011 proved the country’s “capacity to 
withstand major shocks”.323 While expecting the country’s economic growth to be 
4.2 per cent in 2011, the central bank of Estonia forecasted 2010 to be finished with 
the growth of 2.5 per cent.324       
 
4.2.2. Structural Dimension:  the OECD factor      
 
In conjunction with the permanent demand for foreign penetration in the rapidly 
developing Baltic States’ region – primarily, to support the upgrading of industrial 
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structures and to improve competitiveness of the market in general325 – the factor of 
Estonia’s perspective accession to the OECD is not likely to be underrated by New 
Zealand. For New Zealand, the odds to become interested in the Baltics and to 
formalise the necessity of getting promoted in the Baltic region will have increased 
dramatically with Estonia being not only a Member State of the EU but also, due to 
the country’s considerable achievements in the recent years, one of the OECD states 
as well. As it was noted by Saar, the OECD members are usually “trend-setters in 
their respective regions”.326 Pallum commented on the issue that Estonia has been 
waiting for such recognition for more than a decade and that the Estonian people 
could rightfully note their country’s “growth and development”.327 The February 
2008 two-day visit of the OECD Secretary General Angel Gurria to Tallinn was 
considered as “fresh encouragement”328 for Estonia on its way to be called one of 
the world’s most developed country. 
 
Another interesting OECD-related indicator that opens up Estonia’s potential for 
New Zealand is the organisation’s Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA). In 2006, Estonian school children performed well on the science scale, 
being ranked fifth (together with Japan) among 57 countries – both full members of 
the OECD and its partners.329 Only participants from Finland, Hong Kong, Canada 
and Chinese Taipei scored higher results, and New Zealand, Australia and the 
Netherlands coming next after Estonia.330  
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4.2.3. Saaremaa-New Zealand connection        
 
In July 2007, both Pallum and Raie noted that some of New Zealand products had 
already entered the Estonian market, crediting global distribution for brining quality 
Kiwi wine into the country.331 As a commodity, New Zealand wine has only 
recently started picking up its popularity in Europe. For New Zealand, it is a NZ$ 
1.2 billion industry in nowadays, and it is no longer a secondary segment of the 
country’s economy as it used to be 10 years ago.  
 
There are, however, some other items, of which New Zealand was known for 
decades. An Estonian company decided to bank on what has got global reputation of 
technological advancement, quality and reliability – New Zealand farming 
equipment. Saaremaa Ökoküla AS or Saaremaa Ecovillage (SE) is arguably one of 
the best examples of establishing highly successful ‘on-the ground’ linkages 
between Estonian and New Zealand businesses.  
 
Driven by a desire to “promote ecologically friendly and traditional […] lifestyle”332 
of Estonia’s largest island Saaremaa, the SE’s owners found partners in New 
Zealand, a country that is known for its ‘clean and green’ image. From 1999, they 
managed to establish stable business connections with an impressive range of New 
Zealand companies such as Tru-Test Group,333 an internationally recognised New 
Zealand-originated and -based conglomerate that manufactures electronic livestock 
weighing systems and milk metering equipment. The SE became an official 
representative of Prattley Industries Limited,334 a South Canterbury producer of high 
quality animal handling equipment, in the Baltic States. In April 2008, the SE 
together with Prattley’s executive Graham Ward took part at the biggest regional 
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agricultural expo MAAMESS. Hando Sutter, the SE’s co-owner, noted that “it was 
very useful for [his local] customers to get explanations directly from the 
manufacturer”, adding that the New Zealand business partner “had a chance to 
better understand how [Baltic] farmers think”.335      
 
In 2010, The New Zealand Pump Company336 became another addition to the list of 
the SE’s partners from the South Pacific. The SE is also eyeing Robertson 
Engineering Limited, an Upper Hutt business that is famous of its trade-mark 
Strainrite fencing systems, to potentially become its distributor in Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania.337    
 
4.2.4. Openness as a natural quality       
 
It has been argued that the EU “understands itself […] as liberal, participatory and 
social democracy”.338 One of the EU’s main legal documents, the Maastricht Treaty 
of the European Union, underlines the common nature of such principles as “liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and […] the rule of law”339 for each of the 
EU’s Member States. The Estonian multinational society is no different than, for 
example, Germany or France, in applying democratic postulates in the every-day 
life. A number of respected global surveys have been confirming the fact that 
Estonia is “a promising young actor in the league where New Zealand has already 
established its place”.340 Tables 7 and 8 represent New Zealand’s and the Baltics’ 
indicators of economic freedom as well as freedom of the press. In both surveys, 
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Estonia is featuring not only as a leader among the Baltic States but also as one of 
the most liberal and free nations globally. When Taavi Aas, Tallinn’s Deputy 
Mayor, had been characterising both his country and city as “very open”,341 his 
statement was arguably substantiated with empirical data.  
Table 7: Index of Economic Freedom342    
Country/Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
New Zealand 3 3 3 5 6 5 4 
Estonia 6 12 15 12 12 13 16 
Latvia 36 50 37 41 38 45 50 
Lithuania 24 27 24 22 26 30 29 
 
Basic components: Business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, freedom from 
government others.    
 
Table 8: Freedom of the Press343    
 
Country/Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
New Zealand 8 (free) 10 (free) 10 (free) 9 (free) 8-11 (free) 11-13 (free) 11-13 (free) 
Estonia 28 (free) 24 (free) 17 (free) 16 (free) 16-20 (free) 14-17 (free) 19-20 (free) 
Latvia 28 (free) 24 (free) 31 (free) 31 (free) 40-45 (free) 43-48  (free) 55-57 (free) 
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4.2.5 Russia the country next door  
 
In November 2009, the attendees of the NCRE/EUCN international conference 
heard Minister McCully declaring his country’s intention to engage in free-trade 
negotiation with the Russian Federation, the Baltic States’ immediate neighbour. 
Given the facts that Russia is the largest country in the world and New Zealand’s 
fellow APEC member and partner through the ASEAN Regional Forum, the logic of 
such a move was obvious and functionally justified.  
 
In October 2010, Prime Minister Key described Russia as a country that “links both 
the Asia-Pacific and Europe regions”.344 The same month, Tim Groser, the New 
Zealand Minister of Trade, singled the Russian Federation out in the group of 
“second-tier economies”,345 also including Japan, the Republic of Korea and Brazil 
in the same ‘basket’. A month later, Prime Minister Key and Russian President 
Medvedev gave the free-trade process a ‘kick-off’, and Minister Groser even 
commented on his country’s “aggressive trade strategy”.346 An addition that the 
South Pacific democracy is also an active supporter of Russia’s bid for joining the 
WTO, too,347 makes New Zealand’s future cooperation with one of the world’s 
super-powers fairly perspective and potentially highly rewarding from many 
aspects.    
 
There are, however, some arguments, which prevent the pragmatic as well realism-
driven concept of making partnership with the Russian Federation to be 
implemented seamlessly in the future. Firstly, New Zealand was not in a position to 
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‘pick and choose’ – instead, it was chosen. The objectivity of a commentary that 
“Russia want to play and they have chosen New Zealand”348 could hardly be 
questioned, even though New Zealand is currently enjoying the status of the world’s 
biggest exporter of dairy products349. Secondly, according to the 2010 Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index, the Russian Federation is currently one 
of the most corrupt states, holding the world’s 154th place in the group with Central 
African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Papua New Guinea, Tajikistan and some 
others.350 Thirdly, the state of democracy in Russia is alarming. According to the 
2010 Freedom of the Press Index, Russia is sharing with The Gambia the world’s 
175-176th ranking (out of 192 countries), and its press is described as ‘not free’.351 
Lastly, the World Bank Group placed Russia on 120th spot in its 2010 survey On the 
Ease of Doing Business.352 In each of the aforementioned spheres, New Zealand – 
the least corrupt country in the world, a transparent classic democracy with the free 
press and highly efficient regulations of business activity – is directly on the 
opposite site of the charts, if compared to Russia.  
 
New Zealand’s declared intention is to supplement its “WTO engagement with an 
active programme of talking to its trading partners both individually and in 
likeminded groups”.353 The question of whether or not the Russian Federation is 
already included by New Zealand in one of the ‘likeminded groups’ of countries or 
treated ‘individually’ has no clear answer at the moment. In any case, Minister 
Groser’s following statement clarifies the main point: 
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There is a lot at stake. […]The economies of APEC account for over 70 per cent of 
New Zealand total merchandise trade. Our trade with APEC economies has been 
growing at an average of 4.5 per cent per annum over the last 20 years.354 
 
In the framework of prospective engagement with the Russian state, which 
significantly and openly differentiates its vision on democracy from the Western 
democratic postulates of free speech and fair elections, New Zealand arguably needs 
more expertise on Russia provided by reliable partners. As history repeats itself, 
there is also a practical point for New Zealand to engage with the Baltics in the 
context of trading with Russia. In 1920-30s, “a lucrative Russian trade, flowing 
through the Baltic ports”355 had been supporting the British strong interest in the 
Baltic States. This is where Estonia could play an active role as one of the leading 
democracies in the Easter Europe, an expect on Russia and a reliable provider of 
logistics solutions. In November 2010, The New Zealand Herald expressed concerns 
on the deal with the Russian Federation, primarily because of lack if information on 
whether or not “Russia live up to its obligations under a free trade agreement”.356       
 
Whilst aiming to have a better access to the Russian market of 142 million people, 
New Zealand, in case of successfully signing the free-trade deal with the world’s 
largest nation, will be getting access to the sizable markets of Belarus (10 million) 
and Kazakhstan (16 million) as well. The latter two countries are currently engaged 
in the Customs Union with Russia.   
 
It is difficult to assess the volume of New Zealand trade with the Russian Federation 
during the Soviet time. But at a point in history the former Soviet Union was one of 
the main importers of New Zealand products. It is a known fact that, in 1979, the 
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USSR (the entity of fifteen states, including Belarus, Russia, the Baltics, 
Kazakhstan, Ukraine others) led the list of consumers of New Zealand wool.357 
Currently, the independent Russia holds 35th place in the table of New Zealand 
trading partners. 
 
4.2.6. Science, culture, sport & public diplomacy       
 
Arguably, one of avenues for cooperation in science is already on the surface. In 
2004, a New Zealand reporter Amy Fletcher called Estonia “the global leader in 
human gene banking”,358 adding that the Baltic country has also a “global reputation 
for transparency and for robust ethical standards”.359 The author argued that New 
Zealand’s place on this scientific field is yet to be determined, whilst the Estonian 
Government in cooperation with Tartu University already established its innovative 
Estonian Genome Projects in 2001, primarily aiming for acceleration of its work on 
pharmacogenomics as well as providing “information on population health 
patterns”.360     
 
In sport, an international friendly football match that was drawn by the All Whites 
and Estonian national side in Tallinn (May 2006) was one of the very few examples 
when the national teams from the two countries met in sport. Being ranked 39 places 
below Estonia at the time of the game, the New Zealand footballers and coaches 
were visibly glad to get a positive result after the Tallinn encounter.361        
                                                 
357
 Barry Gustafson in New Zealand International Review, January-February 1980 as quoted in Oltarzhevskiy, 
p. 212.  
358
 Amy Fletcher, ‘Would you let the Government sell your genes’ in Unlimited, 26 May 2004. Available 
from <http://unlimited.co.nz/unlimited.nsf/ulfuture/079F4D41EB4FA157CC256EA000149E50>.   
359
 Fletcher.  
360
 Fletcher. See also ‘What is the Genome Project’. Available from 
<http://www.geenivaramu.ee/index.php?id=102>.   
361
 ‘New Zealand vs. Estonia’, 31 May 2006. Available from 
<http://www.bigsoccer.com/forum/showthread.php?t=361374>.    
 105 
In the area of cultural exchange, Loorpärg’s recollections were about a men’s choir 
from a Tallinn university that had been travelling abound New Zealand in mid 
1990s.362 The 2004 Telecom New Zealand International Film Festival featured 
presentations of two animated programmes from Estonia – Estonian Panorama (a 
retrospective of main works produced by Estonian main animation studios, 
Nukufilm and Joonisfilm) and Priit Pärn (featuring three titles produced by this 
internationally acclaimed Estonian director).363 There were also “occasional private 
visits” – for example, a theatrical group RAAM made a trip to New Zealand in 
2009.364   
 
A remarkable gesture of public diplomacy was accomplished by the yacht ‘Lennuk’ 
(from Estonian – ‘Airplane’) departed Tallinn on 16 October 1999 to sail abound the 
world under Estonian flag365, having visited 25 countries (including the Cook 
Islands that is in free association with New Zealand), stopped in 39 ports and 
covered 35,000 miles,366 and came back home on 18 March 2001 to an artillery 
salute.  
 
In August 2004, Marcus Williams, a New Zealand artist and a lecturer at Unitec, 
was one of international participants at the ‘PostsovkhoZ 2004’ festival in Mooste, a 
village in the Estonian south-east.367 Once called the “year’s biggest art event in 
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Estonia”,368 – the ‘PostsovkhoZ’ was an environmental art event collecting “sound 
and video performances, installations and exhibitions”.369  
 
4.3. Operational Dimension:  Estonia as a perspective ‘hub’ for 
New Zealand in the Baltics       
 
Arguably, the 100% Pure New Zealand campaign370 has been successfully sending a 
positive message about New Zealand for the last decade. As for Estonia, the 
importance of creating the country’s brand was recognised straight after the 2001 
Eurovision Song Contest that Estonia won. Having become the first post-Soviet 
nation to top the final table of the popular and widely broadcasted musical contest, 
the Baltic state saw it as an opportunity to introduce itself globally.371 The brand 
Positively Transforming was created in 2002 to be replaced by Positively Surprising 
eight years later372 – the nation expressed its confidence to pleasantly surprise a 
tourist and an international business partner. In this context, the data that was 
generated from the aforementioned semi-structured and structured interviews will be 
of some help to conclude on whether or not the ‘positivism’ of Estonia’s 
‘transformation’ actually ‘surprised’ the interviewees from New Zealand and the 
Baltic States.       
 
Question 3 – Appendix 1 (for New Zealand respondents):   
If the answer to the second question is positive, which country of the three Baltic 
States can become such a ‘gateway’ for New Zealand in the region and why? 
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The number of respondents to this particular question was predictably lower if 
compared to the same data related to the previous two. It happened due to the third 
question’s conditional nature, making it entirely depended on whether or not the 
answer to the second question was positive.  
 
1. 78 per cent of respondents (15 individuals) opted to answer the question. 
Interestingly enough, this number also includes four of elite representatives who 
expressed different level of negativity to the idea of a New Zealand ‘gateway’ to the 
Baltics (second question), but still decided to elaborate on possible options as if the 
actual ‘gateway’ project became reality.   
2. One respondent (student) gave no answer. 
3. 53 per cent of the survey participants (10 people) regarded Estonia as a country 
that could become a ‘gateway’ for New Zealand in the Baltics. In this group, two 
individuals also mentioned Latvia and Lithuania, though making some restrictions 
to the cases.  
 
By choosing Estonia as a strong contender to become a New Zealand ‘hub’ in the 
Baltic region, four of the respondents commented on Estonia’s well-established  
links to Finland and Scandinavia. Arguably, this factor could be treated as a 
pattern. For example, an individual noted that Estonia “could feasibly serve as an 
additional gateway for New Zealand in the Scandinavian countries” (student). The 
other respondent stated that Estonia “bridges both Scandinavia and the Baltic States 
[that] could prove to be a good opportunity” (student). A comment was also made 
that “[b]ecause of Estonia’s links with Finland […] priority should be given to 
Tallinn” (elite). Favouring Estonia, a survey participant backed the answer with the 
existence of the Estonian “tie with Sweden” (student).  
 
As for the next pattern, the economical factor was singled out by five individuals to 
frame it. The pre-recessional Estonian economy was prised with a number of 
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epithets: “the most advanced [among the Baltics]” (student), “strong and healthy 
[with] a booming ICT sector and a highly skilled labour force” (student) and “is 
doing extremely well” (elite). Additionally, an elite representative noted that Estonia 
“might have been a forerunner, […] because it reformed its economic and political 
systems more quickly than [Latvia and Lithuania]”. The other respondent credited 
Estonia’s “economic openness and rapidly developing experience in trade” (elite).             
 
The last of visible patterns generated by this segment of the survey was that the 26 
per cent of survey participants or 33 per cent of those who gave their answers to the 
question (five respondents), expressed no opinion on the subject. Some of the 
typical responses within this trend were “not sure […] – I have little knowledge of 
these countries” (student), “I do not know enough to answer” (student) and “I do not 
[have] sufficient information” (elite). At the same time, three of the five individuals 
(who admitted their lack of knowledge/information on the subject) came out with 
few thoughts on where New Zealand should establish its ‘gateway’ in the Baltic 
region. According to the latter suggestions, New Zealand should look for the 
“geographically central” country (student), or a country “with closest relationship 
and more similarity with New Zealand” (student), or “the closest to a New Zealand 
Embassy/one where New Zealand business links already exist” (student).    
    
Summary of Patterns 
Estonia is the choice as it has strong links to Finland and Scandinavia. 
Estonia’s healthy economy is a key factor in choosing the Baltic country as a 
‘gateway’ for New Zealand to the region.  
Lack of knowledge or information on the issue.   
 
Question 4 – Appendix 1 (for New Zealand respondents):   
What are advantages and disadvantages of considering/recommending Estonia to 
become such a ‘gateway’? 
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This question was intended to go in-depth of the survey participants’ actual 
knowledge about Estonia in the context of a possibility for the country to become a 
New Zealand ‘gateway’ to the Baltic region.  
 
1. 79 per cent of interviewees (15 people) answered the question, often pointing on 
few factors from both advantageous and disadvantageous sides. Similarly to the 
previous segment of the survey, three respondents from the elite group, in spite of 
being negative to the ‘gateway’ project, opted to comment on Estonia’s advantages 
and disadvantages as if it was chosen to become New Zealand’s stronghold in the 
Baltics.   
2. One respondent (student) gave no answer. 
 
Commencing with the data that emphasised the advantageous side of the Estonian 
state, four individuals (21 per cent) noted Estonia’s achievements in the field of 
informational technology such as “a very well developed wireless internet 
infrastructure” (student), “booming ICT” (student), “innovative use of IT” (elite) 
and “the development of its on-line facilities – the e-economy” (elite).  
 
Framed by four respondent, the other pattern was based on the lot of similarities 
between Estonia and New Zealand, namely Estonia’s “small population” (student), 
“clean government” (student), and closeness, together with New Zealand, “to the 
Western European development model” (student). Also, according to a respondent, 
“it would be easy to adjust to life in Estonia” for a New Zealander (student).  
 
A number of economical factors, noted by three respondents, formed the next 
pattern. Estonia was perceived as an “economically, politically and socially 
advanced post-Soviet state” (student). Moreover, the country was associated with 
such important indicators as “strong economy, skilled labour force, […], good 
infrastructure, […] strong export industry […], highly educated population” 
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(student). Lastly for this pattern, the other commentary was about Estonia’s 
“progressive transformation of its economy” (elite).  
 
The linguistic side of the issue was mentioned by five individuals (26 per cent). 
Two of them placed the language issue on the advantageous side as Estonia was 
described as a country with “widespread knowledge of English” (student) where the 
governmental “emphasis being placed on the learning of English” (elite). Very 
much on the contrary to the previous two statements, the other three respondents 
underscored the existence of “language barriers” (student), “difference in language 
skills” (student) and the fact that “not everyone [in Estonia] speaks English” 
(student).  
 
Continuing with disadvantageous factors for Estonia in the context of a New 
Zealand ‘hub’ in the Baltics, four respondents (21 per cent of the total number of 
New Zealand respondents and 27 per cent of those who answered this question) 
commented on the current state of Estonia-Russia relations. One of the elite 
representatives saw potential negativity in “the strong tensions sometimes apparent 
between Estonia and Russia”; the other one noted the “still incomplete integration of 
[Estonia’s] Russian-speaking community”. The Estonian susceptibility to “Russian 
interference” was also noted along with the factor of “bad relation with Russia” 
(student). In addition, one commenter, while admitting his/her “limited knowledge 
of Estonia”, pointed on “issue surrounding Russian citizens living in Estonia” as 
something that for some reason “could be politically dangerous for New Zealand 
relations with Russia” should New Zealand choose Estonia as its ‘hub’ in the Baltics 
(student).      
 
The issue of physical distance from New Zealand to Estonia was featured in three 
answers. Placing the “distance between the two countries” on the disadvantageous 
side, a respondent associated it the “global awareness of ‘green miles’” (student). 
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Another student pointed on Estonia’s “peripheral location”. The next survey 
participant based his answer on “a perception that [Estonia] is a long way away, 
hard to get to and very ‘foreign’” (elite).  
 
The fact of Estonia’s small population was connected by two individuals with the 
size of the country’s market. In their answers, the two respondents named Estonian 
“small market” (student) and “small size and small domestic market” (elite) as 
disadvantageous factors in the context of the question.  
  
Characteristically for this segment of the survey, a high number of individuals (five 
people or 26 per cent of all respondents) admitted their lack of knowledge on 
Estonia-related issues. Nevertheless, this factor was not a barrier for some of them 
to give their suggestions. As an example, a student emphasised the importance of 
such factors as “existing relations with New Zealand, size of economy and 
economic similarities to New Zealand” in the process of choosing a country to 
become a ‘hub’ for New Zealand in the Baltic States. For the other respondent, it 
was a hard task to differentiate Estonia from Latvia and Lithuania (student).     
  
Summary of advantageous Patterns Summary of Disadvantageous Patterns 
E-Estonia The bad state of Estonia-Russia 
relations 
Estonia and New Zealand have plenty 
in common 
Estonia is a small market 
The Estonian economy is strong and 
advanced 
Distance between New Zealand and 
Estonia 
 Lack of knowledge about Estonia 
The issue of communication (English language in Estonia) 
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Question 4 – Appendix 2 (for the Baltics):    
If the answer to the third question is positive, which country from the three Baltic 
States can become such a ‘gateway’ and why?  
 
The main intention behind of asking this particular question was to get the 
interviewees’ opinions on the country of their choice and in the context of this 
study. Predictably, the vast majority of the survey participants would choose their 
native country. At the same time, there was a chance to see how broad the 
interviewees’ vision of their wider region as well.  
 
1. 78 per cent of the survey participants (28 eight people) opted to answer the 
question (with 81 per cent, 79 per cent and 67 per cent correspondingly of Estonian, 
Lithuanian and Latvian groups).  
2. One participant from the Latvian group had no time left to respond to the 
question. 
3. A significant minority (28 per cent of those who answered this question or eight 
individuals) at least mentioned a Baltic country other than their own.  
4. Three participants (two of them from Lithuania, one from Estonia) did not specify 
any of the Baltics, stating that each of the three has potential to become a New 
Zealand ‘gateway’ in the region. 
 
It was possible to systematise a number of patterns from the answers. The factor of 
location was mentioned by eight individuals (three from the Latvian group and six – 
from the Estonian). Interestingly, three respondents from this group of nine 
contextualised this pattern with Estonia; the others specified it in connections to 
Latvia. For example, a Latvian student noted that his country “is in the middle of 
Baltic States”, adding about its capital Riga as “the biggest city in Baltic region”. 
Another representative of the Latvian studentship stated that his nation’s capital city 
is often called “as the capital of the Baltic States” and that “it is located in a very 
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opportune place – middle of the Baltics”. The factor of Latvia’s “central 
geographical location” was noticed by a survey participant from the Estonian side 
(elite). The same individual also underscored that “in some aspects Latvia is more 
international and global”, giving examples of McDonald’s and Coca-Cola, which 
established their regional headquarters in Riga. Identical sentiments were expressed 
by an Estonian student; in his opinion, Latvia “has been very often chosen as a 
‘gateway’ to the Baltic market” primarily because of the country’s “central position 
in the Baltics”. Two respondents from the Estonian elite group elaborated on Riga’s 
status: one of them noted that the Latvian capital “is currently getting a lot of 
attention”, the other one pointed on Riga that is becoming a “choice of many foreign 
companies and organisations in the business world […] because it is in the centre of 
the region”. Finally for this pattern, an Estonian student’s statement that his home 
country “has always been the crossing point of different trade routs due to [its] 
georgraphical location” was indirectly backed by two other expressions. A Latvian 
respondent saw positive signs in Estonia’s “proximity” to Scandinavia (student), and 
an Estonian elite representative saw his country’s advantages in “good connections 
by the sea, road, railway and air”.    
 
The motif of perspective, innovation and growth was featured in thirteen answers. 
Descriptions of Lithuania as “a very perspective country”, “a growing country” and 
“a leading country in the region” were reinforced by the statement that it is 
“growing faster than other Baltic countries” (all are students, Lithuania). At the 
same time, a Latvian student noted that Estonia’s “economic situation has always 
been a bit better” and that it “has the highest comparative advantage in producing 
goods than the rest of the Baltic countries”. Another individual from the Lithuanian 
group took a unified approach by underlining that each of the three Baltics could 
become a New Zealand ‘hub’ in the region because “their economies [are] quite 
strong and have positive potential” (student). Estonia was described as “a country of 
innovation in a variety of fields” (student, Estonia) as well as an “interesting ground 
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and very good base for cooperation” (elite, Estonia). On the business theme, 
Lithuania was seen as a nation with “a lot of potential in business and entertainment 
fields” (student, Lithuania) and “biggest country with good business potential and 
political values” (student, Lithuania). Estonian respondents noted that their native 
land “seems to be the most innovative” (student) with “a very advanced business 
culture” (elite), “liberal business and tax conditions and […] active and positive 
people” (elite).   
 
The importance of cultural compatibility in the process of enhancing relationships 
with New Zealand was underscored by some of respondents from the Estonian 
group (four answers). For example, due to the fact that many Estonians had been 
able to speak Finnish and had “higher affiliation with Scandinavian countries”, the 
Estonian people had good understanding of the Western society through the so-
called ‘illegal’ watching of the Finnish TV many years “before the iron curtain fell” 
(student). A representative from the elite group suggested that “culturally [for New 
Zealand] it would be easier” to establish its ‘gateway’ to the Baltics in Estonia. The 
factor of “closeness of the two nations, disregarding the issue of geographic 
proximity” was featured in the next commentary (elite). Estonia was also 
characterised as “the most open minded” country (student) that, together with 
Latvia, has got the “go-ahead attitude” (student).     
 
The Baltic States’ advancement in the area of information technology and 
communication formed the last pattern of segment. Estonian and Latvia were 
credited for their “good internet and other net communication development” 
(student, Estonia). A respondent from the Lithuania elite group stated that, in her 
country, New Zealand will find “the best way to communicate”. It was also 
suggested that Estonia “have prominence in the areas of information and 
communication technology” (elite, Estonia).   
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It may come as a surprise, but the Lithuania’s size that could supposedly be 
perceived as an advantage (both land and population wise) was mentioned in two 
answers only. In a significant addition, the state of interactions with the 
neighbouring Russian Federation was noted only once in this segment of the survey, 
contextualising it with Lithuania that, in the interviewee’s opinion, enjoys “best 
relations with Russia out of the three” Baltics (elite, Lithuania).    
 
Summary of Patterns 
The location factor 
Innovation and growth 
Cultural compatibility 
IT and communication 
 
4.4. Mini-conclusion  
 
The final chapter of the paper brought up a brief historical overview of New 
Zealand’s interaction with Estonia. The long period of national suppression during 
the Nazi and Soviet occupations preconditioned Estonia’s present choice to firmly 
position itself on the intergovernmental stage. The complications of the Soviet 
period – when it was hardly possible for a Kiwi to single Estonia out of the union of 
the Soviet republics – are in the past by now. The independent Estonian state has 
already become known globally because of its achievements – strong fiscal policy, 
flat taxation, IT advancements, success in regional development, forward-looking 
attitude and cultural compatibility with the Western world. A number of positive 
indicators (the SE’s interactions with New Zealand business partners, possibilities 
for cooperation in genetic research and welcoming messages from the Baltic side) 
led to the argument that New Zealand would have no significant barriers in the 
process of introducing itself to the Baltics via Estonia, if it ever wanted to do so. 
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Encouragingly for the idea of the New Zealand ‘hub’ in the Baltics, the survey 
showed no signs of antagonistic behaviour towards each other expressed by the 
participants from the Baltic States.  In general, both the elite representatives and the 
studentship of the Baltics had been more objective rather than subjective, while 
responding to the questionnaire. For example, the Latvian capital’s strategic location 
was never silenced by respondents from Estonia.  
 
However, once again, the realism-originated factors played their roles to question 
the theoretical framework that was taken to be tested in the context of this chapter. 
The unfaded phenomenon of intergovermentalism (it was suggested to be of some 
help for New Zealand to choose its ‘gateway’ in the Baltics) has not only been 
framing the strong geo-political silhouettes of the Baltic States. Also, it has 
paradoxically strengthened the EU (as a supranational entity and a single point of 
contact fro New Zealand) and continental powers like Russia. The latter entity’s 
lucrative market – in spite of the Russian Federation’s alarming attitude towards 
democracy and the free press – is New Zealand’s nouvelle point of interest. In this 
case, the present status of Estonia’s relations with the world’s largest country is far 
from being considered as advantageous if contextualised with this paper’s topic.       
 
At the same time, whilst the Baltics-New Zealand interactions are featuring the 
obvious lack of maturity, the concept of New Zealand’s ‘hub’ in the Baltic States 









This paper was initiated to be a modest contribution to the development of European 
Studies in New Zealand. The appearance of the EU on the world’s political map 
took Europe by surprise. The continent had still been experiencing painful 
‘aftershocks’ from the dramatic collapse of another political union, the totalitarian 
Soviet communist empire, when the ‘Maastricht Treaty on EU’ was signed. For 
New Zealand, the massive supranational entity of the EU is primarily an economic 
partner and a cultural home. A sizable part of New Zealand’s societal mosaic is 
European by birth, and majority of the New Zealand population have strong 
European roots. At the same time, the EU in its present form has only few 
similarities with its historical predecessors. Its enormous economic might is well-
known and globally respected. Its recognisable political portrait is yet to be 
developed. The later factor represents an issue for countries like New Zealand – 
dealing with the world’s biggest single market and largest political union of 27 
Member States is not an easy task.  
 
In the light of New Zealand’s recent attempts to learn more about the EU’s newest 
parts, this paper aimed to investigate avenues to improve the status quo in the area 
of political, business, scientific and person-to-person relations with the Baltic States.  
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are currently among the least known countries for 
New Zealanders. Only 99, 123 and 264 residents of New Zealand speak 
correspondingly Estonian, Lithuanian and Latvian languages (as compared, for 
example, to 37,509 of German speakers).373 But the Baltic trio (together and 
separately) represent one of the core elements of the EU’s contemporary political, 
economic and security frameworks. From 1990s, the Baltic States and Poland have 
become renowned worldwide for successfully tackling such a “constraining 
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ideological cliché as the ‘European East’”.374 Some experts in the field have already 
argued that such a cliché is “no longer defensible”.375 In 1999, the then newly 
elected Latvian President Vīķe-Freiberga, a scholar who spent significant time of 
her life working on scientific cooperation between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, 
noted:  
[The Baltics] […] have not only their geographical location, their geographical 
contiguity and the experience of the last half century in common. They also share a 
common set of values, attitudes and goals about where they are heading. These 
values and goals are remarkably coherent and well founded. They fit rather 
beautifully with where the rest of Europe is and wants to be going during the next 
century.376 
 
Before proceeding further in the process of enhancing cooperation, this paper 
recommended, firstly, to test the actual necessity for New Zealand to be properly 
introduced to and promoted in the Baltics; secondly, to evaluate the idea for New 
Zealand to establish a formal or informal ‘hub’ in one of the Baltic States; and 
thirdly, to investigate a possibility for Estonia to become such a ‘hub’. 
Characteristically, the methodological ‘trident’, consisting of theoretical, structural 
and operational dimensions, was to be employed to answer each of the 
aforementioned research questions. The intention was to approach the process under 
study from the multidimensional perspective.  
 
Due to the factor that the scholarly field of New Zealand interactions with the post-
Soviet countries is among the least developed, the process of research on this 
dissertation’s topic was featured by the limited evidence. It order to overcome it, a 
high number of primary and secondary sources on similar interactions were gathered 
to obtain the data for this paper. From a variety of methods of data collection, the 
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main emphasis was on semi-structural (in person) and structural (by e-mail) 
interviews with key informants from New Zealand and the Baltics. In July-August 
2007, a trip to Estonia was made by author to conduct several interviews in Tallinn. 
Arguably, the final number of interviewees (especially, from the student group) was 
not high enough to carry a standard degree of representativeness. However, the 
quality of the elite sample – it included Ambassadors, a former Prime Minister, a 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs, a group of high-profile foreign policy makers, 
members of parliaments, business leaders and Honourary Consuls – was more than 
satisfactory.  
 
5.1. Findings  
 
This research had been implementing at a very specific time – the time of global 
economic recession that ruthlessly shook the postulates of globalisation. New 
Zealand, a developed country that represents the world’s fifth biggest exclusive 
economic zone,377 is still experiencing recessional contractions. The Baltics were 
among the worst hit by the global economic downturn, with the Latvian economy 
having had to be bailed out. But paradoxically, the ‘doom and gloom’ moments 
reverted to a time of opportunities. On this background, the question on whether or 
not New Zealand needs to be better introduced to the EU’s neophytes from the 
Baltic States is arguably becoming rhetorical. Pushed by the newest wave of 
functionalist vectors,  the like-minded countries, including those that treasure values 
of liberalism, democracy and transparency, could easily challenge the difficult times 
with the common approach based on understanding the common needs. At the same 
time, the postulates of “theoretical logic” are certainly not the same as the factors of 
“historical and empirical probability”.378 In our case, the structural side of the need 
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to enhance cooperation is noticeably sporadic. The Baltics are very much aware of 
New Zealand and what it can offer, the New Zealand side is still in the process of 
learning about the eastern fringe of the EU. It was suggested that the factors of 
Estonia joining the EURO currency zone and the exclusive OECD club will play 
beneficial roles for the Baltics as a region – with immediate effect, the trio will 
likely to get a more pronounced characterisation in New Zealand then. 
 
During the PM Clark era (1999-2008), New Zealand showed its proactive approach 
to the ever-present regionalism in Europe. Both Warsaw and Stockholm Embassies 
were established with a strong emphasis on learning about unique features of 
correspondingly Central-Eastern Europe and the Scandinavian world. As a step 
further in this direction, it was suggested for New Zealand to recognise the Baltics’ 
strategic position in the EU and the regions undisputed achievements with the 
establishment of a regional ‘hub’/‘gateway’ to deepen the knowledge about the 
Baltic States’ potential. From the structural point of view New Zealand and the 
Baltics are very much ready to move onto the next level of cooperation. However, a 
number of realism-originated factors are re-adjusting strategic vectors. With the 
change of government (the National Party-led Government is in power from 
November 2008), New Zealand’s approach in general is becoming even more 
‘thematic/regional’. The accent is apparently on the other regions thought. Minister 
Groser, a key strategist behind New Zealand’s contemporary trading policy, noted 
that the 1973 enlargement of the EU’s historic predecessor taught his country a 
priceless lesson – it could no longer afford “to be complacent”.379 Minister Groser 
underscored that one of New Zealand’s focuses at present is to make “a contribution 
to economic growth and social prosperity in [its] Asian neighbours”.380 Thus it is not 
surprising to see no distinct European vector specified in the list of the New Zealand 
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Government Priorities (shown in the ‘Statement of Intent: 2010-2013’).381 Does it 
mean that New Zealand is already considering the EU’s market as a given? Or is it 
seriously counting on successful conclusion for the WTO Doha Round with the EU 
as a part of it? In the context of this paper, these questions, with necessity, need to 
be answered sooner rather than later. From the operational angle, the paradigm of 
cooperation between the Baltics and New Zealand is arguably lacking substance. 
The rather chaotic activity in trade receives no visible help from the educational 
(student exchange, scholarly collaboration), business development (New Zealand 
EXPO in the region) and public diplomacy sectors (sister cities). Moreover, for 
smaller countries like New Zealand, the question of ‘bottom line’ is extremely 
important in the process of interactions activisation.    
 
If New Zealand ever wanted to set up its formal or informal ‘hub’ in the Baltic 
States, the argument on Estonia as a location of the ‘hub’ would be easily validated. 
The smallest as well as the wealthiest from all of the Soviet titular republics, Estonia 
acted as an informal leader among the Baltics from the very beginning of the 
turbulent 1990s. It was Tallinn that, in May 1990, hosted leaders of Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania for their first of such meetings in fifty years; the summit eventuated 
with signing “a joint declaration renewing the Baltic Entente of 1934”.382 In less 
than a year, during the dramatic time of the January 1991 crisis in the Lithuanian 
capital, the leader of the then democratic Russia Boris Yeltsin flew to Tallinn to join 
his counterparts from the Baltics in their appeal to the UN to intervene”383 and put 
pressure on the Soviet Government.   
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Estonia’s current anticipation is to catch up with its powerful Nordic neighbours – 
Finland and Sweden.384 As a forward-looking country and a Wester-style 
transparent democracy, it takes pride in delivering results and achieving goals. 
Considering what Estonia has already achieved in the recent time, its latest goal – to 
become one of Europe’s wealthiest nations per capita in the next 15 years385 – does 
not seem like an improbable science fiction. Evidently, the discovery of the Baltics 
via Estonia is a possibility for New Zealand. In September 2010, Minister Paet 
issued an invitation to his New Zealand counterpart to visit Estonia. He noted:  
Estonia and New Zealand’s soldiers are together on the mission in Afghanistan, so 
in addition to our bilateral relations we also have common goals internationally. 
[…] Estonia feels it is important to intensify relations between the European Union 
and New Zealand, as we partners who share the same values.386 
 
There are, however, other types of indicators that are questioning the whole concept 
of a New Zealand ‘hub’ in the Baltics. Primarily, Estonia is an integral part of the 
EU. Having adopted and implemented more than 23,000 of the supranational 
union’s regulations,387 it will be harder and harder for the country to be seen on the 
intergovernmental stage for the longer period. For New Zealand, the main point of 
contact at the EU is extremely important – is it going to be shifting further towards 
Brussels or will New Zealand have to engage in discussions with all of the 27 
Member States of the EU?  
 
In general, the main methodological lesson learnt in the process of conducting this 
research work was the need of using realism-originated vectors in validating the 
paper’s theoretical framework. Despite the concept of the New Zealand ‘gateway’ to 
the Baltic States has potential, the Baltics-New Zealand interactions are featuring 
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the obvious lack of maturity at the moment. Ironically, the sporadic character of 
contacts makes every visit of a high-profile politician from the Baltic States a mega-
event. Back in February 2006, the then New Zealand PM Helen Clark described the 
Lithuanian President Adamkus’ visit to the country as “historic”.388 The same 
rhetoric was used during the visit of the Estonian Foreign Minister Paet.389 It is also 
true, too, that there is only a small capacity for the two sides to engage.  
 
5.2. Where to from here?  
 
In the context of this paper’s research questions, the ‘top-down’ strategic reasoning 
will have to overcome a number of stumbling blocks from the New Zealand side. 
Instead, the ‘bottom-up’ approach that could generate a high number of micro-
successes should with necessity lead towards enhancing cooperation between the 
two parties, presenting the final result as a fait accompli. In this process, one should 
not forget about but rather appreciate the positive messages coming from the Baltic 
States. As Sutter noted:     
[T]here are many more things [rather] than just efficient farming to learn from New 
Zealand. One should not be afraid of a distance as we were in the first place. 
Actually, this cooperation works better than very often inside the EU. Even 
transportation cost from New Zealand was very reasonable and did not make the 
products much more expensive to our market. Also, people I have met up to now 
are very friendly and easy communicating. Nice experience!390 
 
 
                                                 
388
 ‘Lithuanian President to visit New Zealand’ in The Official web portal of the New Zealand 
Government . Available from <http://beehive.govt.nz/node/24968>.   
389
 ‘Visit by Estonian Foreign Minister’ in New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
 official web portal, April 2009. Available from <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-
Relations/Europe/index.php>.   
390
 Sutter, e-mail to author.  
 124 
The outstanding role of New Zealand academia in the process of developing the 
field of European Studies should also open up a number of avenues for the South 
Pacific nation discovering the EU-27. For example, the European Commission has 
already noted the effectiveness of New Zealand scholars in developing European 
integration studies at the University of Canterbury and “creating a dynamic research 
team” at the NCRE.391 A matrix for the dialogue is getting formed, the substance 
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Appendix 1  
 
Questionnaire for New Zealand respondents 
 
 
Question 1:  
Is it necessary for New Zealand to promote its image, business interests, scientific 
achievements and political values in the Baltic States, one of the newest parts of the 
European Union?  
 
Question 2:  
Does an idea to choose one of the three Baltic States as a ‘gateway’ for promoting New 
Zealand image, business interests, scientific achievements and political values in the 
Baltics have a perspective? 
 
Question 3:  
If the answer to the second question is positive, which country of the three Baltic States can 
become such a ‘gateway’ for New Zealand in the region and why?       
 
Question 4:  
What are advantages and disadvantages of considering/recommending Estonia to become 











Appendix 2  
 
Questionnaire for respondents from the Baltics States 
 
 
Question 1:  
Considering the recent changes in Central-Eastern Europe (the EU enlargements, the 
‘coloured’ revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, the establishment of the Community of 
Democratic Choice), what is the role of the Estonian/Latvian/Lithuanian state in this 
process?  
 
Question 2:   
Would you think that New Zealand has chances to be welcomed by both elites and the 
public in the Baltic region (particularly in Estonia/Latvia/Lithuania) as a potential high-
scale partner of the Baltic States? 
 
Question 3:   
Does an idea to choose one of the three Baltic States as a ‘gateway’ for promoting New 
Zealand business potential, democratic values and scientific achievements in the Baltics 
have a perspective? If ‘yes’, is there a chance to have a reverse effect – when your region 
will choose New Zealand for the same reason? 
 
Question 4:  
If the answer to the third question is positive, which country of the three Baltic States can 
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